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327 
COMMENT 
Merchant Restraints: Credit-Card-Transaction Surcharging 
and Interchange-Fee Regulation in the Wake of Landmark 
Industry Changes 
I. Introduction 
A customer orders an espresso-based beverage at her favorite local 
coffee shop. Thumbing past cash, she retrieves a debit card. An idea strikes. 
She can accrue a few reward points by using a credit card in lieu of debit or 
cash. The cashier swipes the customer’s credit card. Soon, a barista shouts 
the customer’s name and the customer collects her drink. She leaves, likely 
not knowing that the owner of her favorite coffee shop just made 
significantly less on the sale simply because she elected to pay with a credit 
card instead of with a debit card or cash.  
Each day, merchants across America cumulatively make millions of 
dollars less on sales than they otherwise would have simply based on the 
method of payment a customer uses. Unbeknownst to most consumers, 
credit-card transactions cost merchants an average of six times more than 
cash transactions because of the increased fees credit-card companies and 
banks charge merchants for those transactions.1 As Federal Reserve 
economists have noted, “What most consumers do not know is that their 
decision to pay by credit card involves merchant fees, retail price increases, 
a nontrivial transfer of income from cash to card payers, and consequently a 
transfer from low-income to high-income consumers.”2 A majority of these 
fees fund reward programs, meaning merchants actually pay for credit-card 
customers’ reward perks—not credit-card companies. Historically, 
merchants have been expressly or effectively restrained from surcharging3 
to recover these fees or even steering customers toward using a payment 
                                                                                                                 
 1. David Humphrey et al., What Does It Cost to Make a Payment?, 2 REV. NETWORK 
ECON. 159, 162-63 (2003); see also Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Social Costs of Credit 
Card Merchant Restraints, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 1-2 (2008). 
 2. Scott Schuh et al., Who Gains and Who Loses from Credit Card Payments? Theory 
and Calibrations, FED. RES. BANK BOS. 1 (Pub. Pol’y Discussion Paper No. 10-03, Aug. 31, 
2010), http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/ppdp/2010/ppdp1003.pdf. 
 3. The United States Code defines “surcharge” as “any means of increasing the regular 
price to a cardholder which is not imposed upon customers paying by cash, check, or similar 
means.” 15 U.S.C. § 1602(r) (2012). See also, Surcharge, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 
ed. 2014) (defining surcharge as imposing “[a]n additional tax, charge, or cost”). The term 
“checkout fee” is becoming more widely used by retailers.  
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alternative that is cheaper for the merchant. This forces the merchant into a 
troubling dichotomy: either accept less profit on a sale or increase prices on 
all products to account for the interchange fees incurred from credit-card 
users. The former option harms the merchant, while the latter harms non-
credit-card users like customers paying with cash, check, or debit card. 
Visa and MasterCard charged U.S. merchants $35.56 billion in credit-
card-processing fees in 2013, almost three times as much as the $12.75 
billion in debit-card fees charged for virtually the same purchase volume: 
$1.6 trillion.4 Some 60%-80% of credit-card companies’ revenues come 
directly from merchants.5 
While these fees may seem like “the cost of doing business,” merchant-
credit-card fees have been the subject of numerous Department of Justice6 
and international antitrust actions,7 private class-action lawsuits,8 and 
scholarly criticism.9 These challenges allege or adjudge collusion among 
credit-card companies to artificially determine and inflate merchant fees, 
amounting to antitrust violations.10 For example, in 2013 Visa and 
MasterCard settled a class-action lawsuit alleging conspiracy among credit-
card companies and banks to fix fees in violation of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act.11 As one of the terms of the record $7 billion settlement, Visa and 
MasterCard agreed to end the contractual no-surcharge policy they imposed 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Merchant Processing Fees in the U.S., NILSON REP. (HSN Consultants Inc., 
Carpinteria, Cal.), May 2014, at 12 (excluding private label cards). The weighted average fee 
for all Visa and MasterCard credit cards was 2.17% in 2013, while the same average for 
debit cards was almost a third, or 0.76%. Id. 
 5. DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC: THE DIGITAL 
REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING 150 (2d ed. 2005). 
 6. See, e.g., United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 232 (2d Cir. 2003); 
United States v. Am. Express Co., No. 10-CV-4496(NGG)(RER), 2015 WL 728563, at *7 
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2015). 
 7. See, e.g., Commission Decision 264/04, 2009 O.J. (C 264) 9-11 (EC), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2009:264:FULL&from=EN; Case C-
382/12 P, MasterCard v. Eur. Comm’n, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEXLEXIS 1 (Jan. 30, 2014), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=157521&pageIndex=0&do
clang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3927. 
 8. See, e.g., In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986 
F. Supp. 2d 207, 214 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), appeal filed, No. 14-241 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 9. See, e.g., Alan S. Frankel & Allan L. Shampine, The Economic Effects of 
Interchange Fees, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 627, 628 (2006); Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The 
Economic Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1321, 1343 (2008). 
 10. See sources cited supra notes 6-9. 
 11. In re Payment Card Interchange, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 213.  
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on merchants.12 American Express and Discover appear to be ending their 
no-surcharge policies as well.13 Accordingly, merchants may now choose to 
recover these fees by surcharging credit-card transactions at the point of 
sale without violating agreements with credit-card networks or banks. 
Nine states, however, still impose statutory no-surcharge prohibitions.14 
These nine states’ statutes, cloaked as consumer-protection statutes, are the 
result of heavy lobbying by credit-card companies in targeted states in the 
1980s.15 Interestingly, Oklahoma stands as the only state with two 
seemingly identical no-surcharge statutes.16 Even though Visa and 
MasterCard have ended their contractual prohibition against surcharging, 
merchants in these nine states cannot surcharge without violating state laws. 
In addition to these current statutes, eighteen states are currently 
considering no-surcharge laws.17 Minnesota stands as the only state that 
expressly protects merchants’ ability to surcharge, subject to proper 
disclosure to customers.18  
To complicate this area of law further, federal district courts in 
California and New York recently found their states’ no-surcharge statutes 
unconstitutional.19 In the New York case, the court disapprovingly stated 
the following: 
Alice in Wonderland has nothing on section 518 of the New 
York General Business Law. Under the most plausible 
interpretation of that section, if a vendor is willing to sell a 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Settlement Agreement, In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. 
Antitrust Litig., No. 05-MD-1720(JG)(JO), 2012 WL 3932046 (E.D.N.Y. July 13, 2012) 
[hereinafter Settlement Agreement].  
 13. See infra notes 162-163 and accompanying text.  
 14. See Table 1 (Appendix).  
 15. See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 975 F. Supp. 2d 430, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013) (“In 1984, . . . Congress allowed the [federal] no-surcharge provision to lapse. In 
response, the credit-card industry began lobbying for state-level no-surcharge laws . . . .”); 
Levitin, supra note 1, at 9 n.35 (“Based on barebones legislative history for eleven of the 
twelve states with no-surcharge rules, most state no-surcharge rules appear to be the result of 
credit card industry lobbying in the 1980s.”). 
 16. 14A OKLA. STAT. § 2-211 (2011) (regulating “Maximum Charges” in the Oklahoma 
Consumer Credit Code); id. § 2-417 (regulating “Limitations on Agreements and Practices” 
in the Oklahoma Consumer Credit Code) 
 17. Kevin Wack, 18 States Considering Bans on Credit Card Surcharges, AM. BANKER, 
Apr. 1, 2013, at 4. 
 18. See MINN. STAT. § 325G.051(a) (2012). 
 19. Italian Colors Rest. v. Harris, No. 2:14-IC-00604-MCE-DAD, 2015 WL 1405507, 
at *9 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2015), appeal filed, No. 15-15873 (9th Cir. 2015); Expressions, 
975 F. Supp. 2d at 447. 
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product for $100 cash but charges $102 when the purchaser pays 
with a credit card, the vendor risks prosecution if it tells the 
purchaser that the vendor is adding a 2% surcharge because the 
credit card companies charge the vendor a 2% “swipe fee.” But 
if, instead, the vendor tells the purchaser that its regular price for 
the product is $102, but that it is willing to give the purchaser a 
$2 discount if the purchaser pays cash, compliance with section 
518 is achieved. . . . [T]his virtually incomprehensible distinction 
between what a vendor can and cannot tell its customers offends 
the First Amendment and renders section 518 unconstitutional.20 
Notwithstanding this rebuke, federal district courts in Florida21 and Texas22 
dismissed similar cases with prejudice, finding their state no-surcharge laws 
constitutional under rational-basis review. Adding a final layer of 
complication to this landscape, this issue has developed into a circuit split. 
The Second Circuit recently vacated the opinion of the federal district court 
in New York and determined that New York’s no-surcharge law was indeed 
constitutional,23 while the Eleventh Circuit came to the exact opposite 
conclusion and found Florida’s no-surcharge law unconstitutional in late 
2015.24  
This Comment analyzes these issues and provides workable solutions for 
both merchants and practitioners to follow. Part I reviews the intricate 
structure of credit-card networks and analyzes industry policies after Visa 
and MasterCard’s landmark class-action settlement. Part II examines state 
and federal no-surcharge statues and analyzes the incongruity in the federal 
courts regarding the constitutionality of these statutes. Part III discusses 
adjudication and regulation of related credit-card fees in foreign countries 
tackling this issue. Part IV provides arguments for and against industry 
reform. Part V concludes with suggested improvements to the current 
system which more adequately balance consumer and merchant protections 
while allowing market forces to work in favor of both. Specifically, this 
Comment supports freeing merchants from anticompetitive surcharge 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Expressions, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 435-36. 
 21. Clerk’s Judgment, Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Bondi, No. 4:14-cv-00134 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 
5, 2014) (order entered Sept. 2, 2014). 
 22. Final Judgment, Rowell v. Pettijohn, No. 1:14-cv-00190 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2014) 
(order entered Feb. 4, 2015). 
 23. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, No. 13-4533, 2015 WL 5692296 (2d Cir. 
Sept. 29, 2015). 
 24. Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Att’y Gen., Fla., No. 14-14426, 2015 WL 6725138 (11th Cir. 
Nov. 4, 2015). 
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restrictions and recognizes the need for federal regulation of credit-card-
interchange fees similar to the federal regulation of debit-card-interchange 
fees. Federal regulation of debit-card-interchange fees has resulted in price 
decreases, job growth, and market transparency.25 
A. Processing a Credit-Card Transaction 
 A credit-card transaction is similar to a check transaction except that the 
ultimate financing or credit underlying the purchase differs.26 Credit-card 
transactions generally involve five parties: the cardholder, the merchant, the 
issuing bank, the merchant bank, and the network.27 The cardholder and the 
merchant are, as primary transactors, necessary parties in a credit 
transaction. The remaining parties are payment-service providers. The 
issuing bank issues the credit card to the cardholder.28 When a cardholder 
presents a credit card to a merchant for a purchase, the merchant relays the 
purchase information to the “merchant bank,”29 sometimes referred to as the 
“merchant acquiring bank”30 or “merchant acquirer.”31 Upon receiving the 
sale information from the merchant, the merchant bank processes the 
information through the “the network.”32 The network consists of credit-
card companies, primarily owned by banks.33 Visa, MasterCard, American 
Express, and Discover make up the four major networks in the United 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Robert J. Shapiro, The Costs and Benefits of Half a Loaf: The Economic Effects of 
Recent Regulation of Debit Card Interchange Fees, NAT’L RETAIL FED’N (Oct. 2013), at 2, 
https://nrf.com/sites/default/files/The_Costs_and_Benefits_of_Half_a_Loaf.pdf. 
 26. Alan S. Frankel, Monopoly and Competition in the Supply and Exchange of Money, 
66 ANTITRUST L.J. 313, 339 (1998). 
 27. In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986 F. Supp. 
2d 207, 214 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).  
 28. Id. J.P. Morgan Chase, Bank of America, American Express, Citibank, and Capital 
One are the largest credit-card issuers worldwide, respectively by credit-card portfolios. 
Largest Credit Card Portfolios Worldwide 2013, NILSON REP. (HSN Consultants, Inc., 
Carpinteria, Cal.), Dec. 2014, at 11. 
 29. In re Payment Card Interchange, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 214. 
 30. See, e.g., Kathleen A. McConnell, The Durbin Amendment’s Interchange Fee and 
Network Non-Exclusivity Provisions: Did the Federal Reserve Board Overstep Its 
Boundaries?, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 627, 630 (2014). 
 31. See, e.g., Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43394-01 (July 20, 
2011). 
 32. In re Payment Card Interchange, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 214. 
 33. Visa and MasterCard “are organized as open joint ventures, owned by the numerous 
banking institutions that are members of the networks.” United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 
344 F.3d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 2003). Member banks of the MasterCard and Visa “networks 
may function either as ‛issuers’ or ‛acquirers’ or both.” Id. 
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States.34 The network relays the information it receives to the customer’s 
issuing bank.35 As the bank that has the information about the customer’s 
account and availability of funds, the issuing bank approves or declines the 
transaction based on the available credit balance and other factors.36 The 
merchant bank receives the approval or denial information and relays it to 
back the merchant at the point of sale.37 The merchant bank credits the 
merchant’s account for the sale price minus a fee, and the issuing bank 
credits the merchant bank minus a fee.38 Sometime later, the issuing bank 
collects a payment from the cardholder on a deferred, revolving-credit 
basis.39 
1. TANSTAAFL:40 The Relevant Fees in a Credit-Card Transaction 
As the saying goes, nothing is free. The issuing bank generally charges 
the cardholder interest,41 annual fees, and other finance charges.42 The 
intermediaries—the merchant bank, network, and issuing bank—receive 
fees from the merchant behind the scenes. When the issuing bank charges 
the cardholder the amount of the transaction, it transmits the amount of the 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Douglas Akers et al., Overview of Recent Developments in the Credit Card Industry, 
17 FDIC BANKING REV. 23, 25 (2005). 
 35. In re Payment Card Interchange, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 214. 
 36. RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF PAYMENT 
CARD MARKETS AROUND THE WORLD 25 (2005). 
 37. In re Payment Card Interchange, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 214. 
 38. Frankel, supra note 26, at 339. 
 39. 2 BARKLEY CLARK & BARBARA CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS 
AND CREDIT CARDS ¶ 15.02 (rev. ed. 2007).  
 40. “There ain’t no such thing as a free lunch.” John Hanna, Book Review, 45 COLUM. 
L. REV. 803, 805 (1945) (reviewing ROBERT H. SKILTON, GOVERNMENT AND THE MORTGAGE 
DEBTOR (1929 TO 1939) (1944)) (applying “this profound economic truth” to government 
loan rates, stating, “Government has nothing to give anybody. What it gives to one man it 
must take from his neighbor.”). The phrase was initialized “Tanstaafl” in the economics 
context in PIERRE DOS UTT, TANSTAAFL: A PLAN FOR A NEW ECONOMIC WORLD ORDER 
(1949), and popularized in MILTON FRIEDMAN, THERE AIN’T NO SUCH THING AS A FREE 
LUNCH (1975). 
 41. Approximately 70% of a typical card issuer’s revenue comes from interest paid by 
cardholders for financed purchases. Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 5, at 223. 
 42. 2 PAYMENT SYSTEMS § 17:2, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2012). Between 1998 
and 2013, average credit-card-interest rates fluctuated between 12.76% and 15.85%. BD. OF 
GOVERNORS FOR THE FED. RES. SYS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE PROFITABILITY OF 
CREDIT CARD OPERATIONS OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS (2014), http://www.federalreserve. 
gov/publications/other-reports/files/ccprofit2014.pdf.  
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purchase through the network to the merchant’s bank, minus an 
“interchange fee”43 charged to the merchant’s bank. The merchant’s bank  
 
 
FIGURE 1: FLOW CHART OF CREDIT OR DEBIT 
TRANSACTION  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
then transmits the amount of the purchase price to the merchant, but not 
before withholding the interchange fee paid to the issuing bank and other 
fees for its services, collectively called a merchant-discount fee.44 In sum, 
“[T]he total amount the merchant receives for the transaction is the 
purchase price minus the sum of the interchange fee and the merchant 
                                                                                                                 
 43. In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986 F. Supp. 
2d 207, 214 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). This is because the acquiring bank must “interchange” the 
transaction with the issuer so that the issuer can bill the cardholder in accordance with the 
terms of their contract. See Nat’l Bancard Corp. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 594 
(11th Cir. 1986). 
 44. See In re Payment Card Interchange, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 214; see also MasterCard 
Interchange Rates and Fees, MASTERCARD, https://www.mastercard.us/en-us/merchants/get-
support/merchant-interchange-rates.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2015) [hereinafter 
MasterCard Fees] (“Interchange fees are one component of the Merchant Discount Rate 
(MDR) established by acquirers, which is paid by merchants to acquirers in consideration for 
card acceptance services.”).  
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discount fee.”45 In material provided to merchants, Visa and MasterCard 
both state the merchant does not pay these fees—acquirers do.46 It is clear, 
however, that acquirers do not effectively pay interchange fees because 
they pass these fees directly to merchants, incorporated into the merchant-
discount fee.47 
With some merchant-discount fees nearing 3.5%,48 on a $100 credit-card 
transaction, the merchant will receive $96.50 with the issuing bank 
retaining a percentage of the sale and the acquiring bank retaining a 
percentage. These fees are significant when compared to cash, where a 
merchant incurs “negligible”49 indirect costs, or debit-card transactions 
carrying an average interchange fee of 0.79%.50 Under no-surcharge 
                                                                                                                 
 45. In re Payment Card Interchange, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 214. It is worth noting, “Visa 
and MasterCard invented ‘interchange fees’ in the 1970s in order to make participation in 
their networks more profitable for card-issuing banks, thus giving the card-issuing banks 
incentives to promote credit card use by their customers.” JANE KAUFMAN WINN & 
BENJAMIN WRIGHT, LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE § 7.07, 2014 WL 2531717 (database 
updated June 2014).  
 46. See, e.g., Interchange: Facilitating Benefits to Cardholders, Merchants and Society, 
MASTERCARD, http://www.mastercard.com/us/merchant/pdf/Interchange_backgrounder.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2015) (“An interchange fee is a small fee paid by a merchant’s acquiring 
bank to a cardholder’s issuing bank as part of an electronic payment card transaction.”); Visa 
USA Interchange Reimbursement Fees, VISA USA 1 (Apr. 18, 2015), https:// 
usa.visa.com/dam/VCOM/download/merchants/Visa-USA-Interchange-Reimbursement-Fees-
2015-April-18.pdf [hereinafter Visa USA Fees] (“Merchants do not pay interchange 
reimbursement fees; merchants pay ‘merchant discount’ to their financial institution.”).  
 47. EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 5, at 155. MasterCard admits this. See 
MasterCard Fees, supra note 44 (“[I]nterchange fees are one component of the Merchant 
Discount Rate (MDR) established by acquirers, which is paid by merchants to acquirers in 
consideration for card acceptance services.”).  
 48. See discussion infra Part I.A.2.  
 49. Bhaskar Chakravorti & Benjamin D. Mazzotta, The Cost of Cash in the United States, 
INST. FOR BUS. GLOBAL CONTEXT 27, 29 (Sept. 2013), http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Costof Cash/ 
~/media/Fletcher/Microsites/Cost%20of%20Cash/CostofCashStudyFinal.pdf. These costs 
include “securing the cash, deposit preparation, armored car service, [and] bank visits.” Id. at 
58. These costs also include accounting and cashier labor costs, but these costs “are generally 
not thought to be marginal to the consumer’s payment choice decision.” Id. at 59. Costs are 
incurred regardless of the payment method because “often the cashiers are there no matter 
whether they are actively running the till or not.” Id. at 57.  
 50. Regulation II: Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE 
FED. RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/regii-average-interchange-
fee.htm (last updated May 12, 2015); see also Visa USA Fees, supra note 46, at 2; MasterCard 
2015-2016 Interchange Programs and Rates, MASTERCARD 4 (Apr. 17, 2015), http://www. 
mastercard.com/us/merchant/pdf/Merchant_Rates_April_2014.pdf [hereinafter MasterCard 
2015-2016 Rates].  
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policies with credit-card companies, merchants could not pass these costs to 
credit-card users. A merchant had to either absorb these fees from profit or 
raise prices across the board, effectively forcing non-credit-card customers 
to subsidize the fees introduced by credit-card users.  
Merchant-discount fees (the portion not including the interchange fee) 
may simply be regarded as “the cost of doing business,” akin to fees for 
accepting debit cards or checks. Credit-card-interchange fees, however, 
have been the subject of numerous Department of Justice51 and 
international antitrust actions,52 private class-action lawsuits,53 and 
extensive scholarly criticism.54 While it is conceptually important to 
understand the distinction between interchange fees and merchant-discount 
fees, the terms are effectively interchangeable insofar as the merchant 
ultimately pays the interchange fee as a portion of its merchant-discount 
fee. 
The abovementioned review describes “open” networks like Visa or 
MasterCard.55 American Express and Discover are “closed-loop” networks 
meaning they operate as the issuer, the acquirer, and the network.56 Under 
this organization, “[T]here is only a merchant-discount fee; there is no 
interchange rate because the same party serves as both issuer and 
acquirer.”57 The analysis discussed herein applies to both open and closed 
networks, as closed networks’ interchange fees and merchant restraints 
have also been the subject of antitrust suits.58 
                                                                                                                 
 51. See, e.g., United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 232 (2d Cir. 2003); 
United States v. Am. Express Co., No. 10-CV-4496(NG)(RER), 2015 WL 728563, at *7 
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2015). 
 52. See sources cited supra note 7. 
 53. See, e.g., In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986 
F. Supp. 2d 207, 214 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 54. See, e.g., Frankel & Shampine, supra note 9, at 627; Levitin, supra note 9, at 1343. 
 55. “MasterCard and Visa are structured as open, joint venture associations with 
members (primarily banks) that issue payment cards, acquire merchants who accept payment 
cards, or both.” United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001), aff’d, 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). 
 56. Levitin, supra note 9, at 1328.  
 57. Id. at 1332; see also Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,396 
(July 20, 2011) (“In some circumstances, an acquirer that is also the issuer with respect to a 
particular transaction may authorize and settle that transaction internally.”). 
 58. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Express Co., No. 10-CV-4496(NGG)(RER), 2015 
WL 728563 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2015); Case C-382/12 P, MasterCard Inc. v. Eur. Comm’n, 
2014 EUR-LexCELEXLEXIS 1 (Jan. 30, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/ 
document.jsf?text=&docid=157521&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=firs
t&part=1&cid=3927. 
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2. How Networks Calculate Interchange Fees 
Interchange fees and merchant discounts vary depending on the type of 
business accepting the credit card. Merchants conducting different types of 
business fall into a particular “Merchant Category Code” (MCC) designated 
by the IRS for card-transaction reporting pursuant to IRS Revenue 
Procedure 2004-43.59 For example, the MCC for a convenience store is 
5499, a chiropractor 8041, and a college or university 8220.60 Major card 
brands use MCCs to influence the interchange fees that a business pays.61 
The most significant factor for determining interchange fees within the 
present scope is the reward program that attaches to a particular card. The 
more rewards a customer is offered on a credit card, the more expensive the 
card is for merchants to accept.62 “Those rewards cost money, and thus 
these cards, referred to in the industry . . . as ‘premium cards,’ are 
associated with higher interchange fees.”63 
For example, instead of the 0.79% debit-card-interchange fee a merchant 
would pay or the nominal, indirect fee for accepting cash or check, the 
Standard Rate paid by a merchant when accepting a Visa Signature 
Preferred card is 2.95%, plus a flat fee of $0.10.64 The same transaction for 
a customer with a Visa Traditional Rewards card would cost the merchant 
2.70% plus $0.10.65 Visa will charge merchants with a restaurant MCC 
2.40% plus $0.10 on a ticket paid using a Visa Signature Preferred card, or 
1.95% plus $0.10 where a Visa Traditional Rewards card is used.66 As 
Figure 2 shows, a majority of this fee goes to pay for customer rewards. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Joseph P. Dewald, Internal Revenue Bulletin 2004-31, IRS (Aug. 2, 2004), 
http://www.irs.gov/irb/2004-31_IRB/ar17.html. Payments using cards for services (as 
opposed to payments for merchandise) must be reported.  
 60. Id. 
 61. Ben Dwyer, Merchant Category Code: Reporting & Rates, CARDFELLOW, 
http://www.cardfellow.com/blog/merchant-category-code-mcc/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2015) 
(where MasterCard TCCs may be obtained); see also Merchant Category Codes for IRS 
Form 1099-MISC Reporting, VISA USA 5 (2004), https://web.archive.org/web/2015090509 
3513/http://usa.visa.com/download/corporate/resources/mcc_booklet.pdf. MasterCard uses 
the same MCCs but uses an additional Transaction Category Code (TCC) to identify general 
business categories. 
 62. Levitin, supra note 9, at 1343.  
 63. In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986 F. Supp. 
2d 207, 214 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 64. Visa USA Fees, supra note 46, at 4. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss2/4
2016]       COMMENT 337 
 
 
Network Brand
3%
Network 
Servicing
4%
Network 
Processing
4%
Issuer 
Processing
9% Network Reward1%
Issuer Rewards
44%
Issuer other costs 
and profit margin
35%
FIGURE 2: ESTIMATED COMPONENTS 
OF CREDIT-CARD-INTERCHANGE FEES67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Similarly, the Standard Rate for a MasterCard World Elite card is 3.25% 
plus $0.10, a MasterCard Enhanced Value card carries a 2.95% plus $0.10 
fee, and a restaurant MCC would be charged 2.20% plus $0.10 if a 
customer opted for a MasterCard World High Value credit card instead of 
cash or debit card.68 These are “default interchange rates” that an issuer 
charges an acquiring bank, and a merchant eventually pays.69 In a closed-
loop system like American Express, a restaurant will pay up to 3.50% plus 
$0.0570 and other possible fees.71 American Express has justified its higher 
                                                                                                                 
 67. See AMY DAWSON & CARL HUGENER, DIAMOND MGMT. & TECH. CONSULTANTS, 
INC., A NEW BUSINESS MODEL FOR CARD PAYMENTS 9 (2014), http://c0462 
491.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/Diamond.pdf; Fumiko Hayashi, Do U.S. Consumers 
Really Benefit from Payment Card Rewards?, FED. RES. BANK OF KAN. CITY 42 (1st Quarter 
2009), http://www.kc.frb.org/PUBLICAT/ECONREV/PDF/09q1Hayashi.pdf.  
 68. MasterCard 2015-2016 Rates, supra note 50, at 2. 
 69. MasterCard Fees, supra note 44. 
 70. Competitive Pricing Plans Your Business Can Afford, AM. EXPRESS, https://qwww 
209.americanexpress.com/merchant/services/en_US/accept-credit-cards#profession=Full%20 
Service%20Restaurant (last visited Feb. 12, 2015). 
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merchant-discount fee by stating that customers spend more when using 
American Express, though this claim is contested.72 
These fees reflect “card-present” transactions, or “face-to-face 
transaction[s] in which a consumer physically presents a [credit] card to pay 
for goods or services from a ‘brick and mortar’ merchant.”73 Conversely, 
“card-not-present” transactions differ in that the merchant never sees the 
card or cardholder but obtains the card number and other necessary 
information by phone or online.74 Card-not-present transactions generally 
carry higher fees than card-present transactions,75 in part because of the 
increased security involved in remote acceptance. 
The brilliance behind this scheme is in credit-card companies’ ability to 
stimulate increased credit card use through customer reward programs 
while externalizing the cost of these incentives. Credit-card companies 
aggressively promote the use of reward cards through constant television 
ads, Internet marketing, and direct mail.76 These advertisements offer 
generous rewards and bonuses for simply using one payment method over 
another. As one Chase executive remarked, “[R]ewards are obviously a key 
determinant in customers’ use of the credit cards, so the behavior of the 
customers that have rewards is that they tend to spend more and use the  
  
                                                                                                                 
 71. For other fees a merchant may incur from American Express, see American Express 
Merchant Reference Guide-U.S., AM. EXPRESS 54-58 (Apr. 2014), https://icm.aexp-static. 
com/Internet/NGMS/US_en/Images/Merchant%20Reference%20Guide_US_%20RefGuide.
pdf [hereinafter American Express Reference Guide].  
 72. See Isabelle Lindenmayer, Warnings of a Downside for Amex in Bank Cards, AM. 
BANKER, Mar. 22, 2005, http://www.americanbanker.com/specialreports/170_8/-244549-
1.html (subscription required). 
 73. Paycom Billing Servs., Inc. v. MasterCard Int’l, Inc., 467 F.3d 283, 286 (2d Cir. 
2006); see also The 2013 Federal Reserve Payments Study, FED. RES. 26 (July 2014), 
http://www.frbservices.org/files/communications/pdf/general/2013_fed_res_paymt_study_deta
iled_rpt.pdf (“Payments initiated when the card is read by a terminal are called card-present 
payments.”).  
 74. Paycom Billing Servs., 467 F.3d at 287.  
 75. See, e.g., Visa USA Fees, supra note 46, at 2-3. 
 76. See ELIZABETH RENUART & KATHLEEN E. KEEST, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE 
COST OF CREDIT: REGULATION, PREEMPTION, AND INDUSTRY ABUSES § 11.8.6-8 (4th ed. 
2009) (analyzing aggressive marketing and “marketing abuses” performed by credit-card 
lenders). 
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card more frequently.”77 Issuing banks generate revenue directly from 
cardholders in the form of interest, fees, and other finance charges, and the 
increased use as a result of heavy marketing and rewards entails a greater 
likelihood that cardholders will pay more in interest and fees.78 Any 
rewards given to cardholders come at relatively little or no expense to 
credit-card companies because merchants’ interchange fees pay for these 
programs. 
In an open system like Visa and MasterCard, the networks establish and 
enforce rules regarding the use of their cards.79 Additionally, each network 
sets its default interchange fees.80 These rules and fees ultimately govern 
the contract between the acquirer and the issuer.81 One significant problem 
is that “[i]nstead of negotiating a separate agreement with each issuer, each 
acquirer simply joins the relevant network and agrees to comply with the 
network rules for all transactions on that network.”82 Thus, the small-
business owner has no bargaining power to negotiate policies or fees, which 
ultimately “insulate[s] the interchange rate from market discipline. 
[Merchants] can only negotiate on the merchant discount fee.”83 Of course, 
no acquirer negotiates a merchant-discount fee lower than the interchange 
fee plus a small profit. Thus, the default-interchange rate “becomes a fixed 
rate that applies to every credit card transaction (with the narrow exception 
of transactions by very large merchants who have sufficient volume that 
they can negotiate their own private interchange fees).”84 
  
                                                                                                                 
 77. Levitin, supra note 9, at 1346 (quoting H. Michael Jalili, New Approaches Advised 
to Cure ‘Rewards Fatigue,’ AM. BANKER 8 (May 21, 2007), http://www.american 
banker.com/issues/172_100/-312658-1.html (subscription required)). 
 78. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 76, § 11.8.6-8. “The substantially worsening 
condition of the credit card consumer’s condition has been accompanied by credit card 
earnings that have been consistently higher than returns on all commercial bank activities.” 
Id. § 2.3.2.3.2. 
 79. Mann, supra note 36, at 21.  
 80. Id. at 26.  
 81. Id. at 21. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Levitin, supra note 9, at 1333. 
 84. In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986 F. Supp. 
2d 207, 214-15 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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Because small businesses constitute 99.7% of businesses in the United 
States85 and contribute to 46% of the GDP,86 their lack of bargaining power 
is significant. The largest merchants like Wal-Mart may have the ability to 
negotiate lower interchange rates from Visa and MasterCard87 but will 
nonetheless incur an interchange fee higher than that of other payment 
methods because of the embedded cost of reward programs on credit-card-
interchange rates. Moreover, networks may recover any discounted rate 
successfully negotiated by larger merchants by increasing default-
interchange rates on smaller merchants that yield no bargaining power, 
further exacerbating the problem. In any event, merchants large and small 
agree that traditional interchange rules involve unlawful practices, as 
demonstrated by a $3.5 billion law suit by Wal-Mart and other large 
retailers against Visa in 200588 and a $7 billion class-action antitrust lawsuit 
settlement in 201389 involving a record twelve million merchant-class 
members.90  
Consider emergency auto repair as an example. At the Standard Rate of 
2.95% plus $0.10,91 upon completing a $2,500 repair, your local repair shop 
pays $73.85 for accepting a Visa Signature Preferred card over other 
payment methods. This fee could have paid for virtually the entire workday 
for a shop cashier at $10.00 per hour.92 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Small Business Facts & Data, SMALL BUS. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP COUNCIL, http:// 
www.sbecouncil.org/about-us/facts-and-data/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (“Firms with fewer 
than 500 workers accounted for 99.7 percent of those businesses, and businesses with less 
than 20 workers made up 89.8 percent. Add in the number of nonemployer firms . . . and the 
share of U.S. businesses with less than 500 workers increases to 99.9 percent, and firms with 
less than 20 workers increases to 98 percent.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 86. Kathryn Kobe, Small Business GDP: Update 2002-2010, SBA OFF. ADVOC. 4, 14 
(Jan. 2012), http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/rs390tot_1.pdf. 
 87. Gwendolyn Bounds, Merchants Balk at Higher Fees for Credit Cards, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 12, 2005, at B1.  
 88. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 89. In re Payment Card Interchange, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 213. 
 90. Discussed infra Part II.B. 
 91. Visa USA Fees, supra note 46, at 4. 
 92. Credit-card companies have used this example in lobbying for the consumer 
protection efficacy of merchant restraints. Visa executives discussed a hypothetical wrecker 
operator “on a rural road in the middle of the night imposing a surcharge” only where the 
cardholder does not have access to alternative payment systems. Mann, supra note 36, at 
125-26. Professor Mann notes, however, that “[t]he risks of price gouging should not be 
allowed to drive a systemic issue such as pricing payment system options in competitive 
markets.” Id. at 126. 
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There is an important impact on the largest merchants as well. On Black 
Friday in 2012 for example, “From 6 p.m. to 10 p.m., Wal-Mart processed 
more than 10 million register transactions in its stores.”93 Conservatively 
assuming an average ticket price of two hundred dollars94 and a negotiated 
merchant-discount rate of 2.0% with a $0.10 flat fee, if only half the 
customers paid with a credit card, Wal-Mart would have paid $20.5 million 
in merchant-discount fees in those four hours alone. 
In addition to paying a merchant-discount fee proportionate to the 
purchase price, merchants must also include any associated taxes95 or tips96 
into the sale price and pay a fee to accept those amounts. Merchants 
primarily furnishing services may report these fees for tax purposes, but 
merchants primarily selling merchandise cannot.97 Thus, merchants selling 
goods must pay an interchange fee on the sales tax they are required to 
collect but ultimately forward to the government.  
State and federal governments are not immune from interchange fees. In 
2007, the federal government paid $433 million in credit-card fees, the 
majority of which were interchange fees.98 While Wal-Mart may have been 
able to negotiate lower fees,99 networks were unwilling to negotiate with 
the government to lower interchange rates.100 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Black Friday Shoppers Have Spoken: Walmart Delivers Biggest Shopping Day of the 
Season, WALMART (Nov. 29, 2013), http://news.walmart.com/news-archive/2013/11/29/black-
friday-shoppers-have-spoken-walmart-delivers-biggest-shopping-day-of-the-season. 
 94. The top-selling items included televisions, tablets, and bicycles. Id. 
 95. Card Acceptance Guidelines for VISA Merchants, VISA USA 9 (2014), 
https://usa.visa.com/dam/VCOM/download/merchants/VBS-06-APR-14-card-acceptance-
guide-for-merchants.pdf [hereinafter Visa Acceptance Guidelines] (“INCLUDE TAX IN THE 
TOTAL TRANSACTION AMOUNT. Any tax that you are required to collect must be included in 
the total transaction amount. Never collect taxes separately in cash.”). 
 96. Levitin, supra note 9, at 1333 (“Interchange rates typically include both a flat fee of 
5 cents to 25 cents and a fee of 1 to 3 percent of the total transaction amount (including taxes 
and tips).”). 
 97. T.D. 9136, 2004-31 I.R.B. 112, 115 (“The second revenue procedure provides an 
optional procedure . . . in determining whether payment card transactions are reportable 
under section 6041 or section 6041A . . . according to whether they predominantly furnish 
services (for which payments are reportable) or predominantly provide goods (for which 
payments are not reportable).”. 
 98. 156 CONG. REC. 4977 (2010) (comments of Sen. Durbin).  
 99. See Bounds, supra note 87. 
 100. 156 CONG. REC. at 4977 (comments of Sen. Durbin). This denial to negotiate with 
the federal government may have provided part of the impetus for federal recognition of the 
need to reform the interchange fee system. See id. 
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In total, personal-consumption expenditures on credit cards amounted to 
$2.49 trillion in the United States in 2013, and economists expect this 
number to increase by a remarkable 65% to $4.11 trillion by 2018.101 In 
2013, 93.32 billion credit, debit, and electronic bank-transfer transactions 
were processed in the United States,102 each presumably incurring some 
kind of processing fee. These figures and projections demonstrate that 
interchange fees are so significant in the United States economy that they 
can no longer be ignored.  
II. Contractual Merchant Restraints 
A. The Different Types of Contractual Restraints 
Credit-card companies have contractual rules that restrain how 
merchants can accept credit cards and how they may (or may not) charge to 
recoup the fees they incur.103 Historically, there have been five significant 
restraints imposed on merchants based on their contracts with credit-card 
companies: (1) no-surcharge rules; (2) no-discount rules; (3) “honor-all-
cards” rules; (4) anti-steering and nondisclosure rules; and (5) no-minimum 
and no-maximum purchase rules. 
1. No-Surcharge Rules 
The term “surcharge” means “any means of increasing the regular price 
to a cardholder which is not imposed upon customers paying by cash, 
check, or similar means.”104 No-surcharge rules prohibit merchants from 
surcharging the merchant-discount fee at the point of sale.105 For example, 
if a company decides to purchase a $100,000 piece of machinery and pays 
with a MasterCard World Elite Business card, the seller could not surcharge 
its $3,250.10 fee.106 The seller would either have to (1) absorb this fee from 
its profit on the sale or (2) raise the price of all machinery, effectively 
                                                                                                                 
 101. Consumer Payment Systems in the U.S. 2013 vs. 2018, NILSON REP. (HSN 
Consultants, Inc., Carpinteria, Cal.), Dec. 2014, at 1. 
 102. Id. at 11.  
 103. David Herr & Steve Baicker-McKee, Law and Motion: Class Actions—Settlement 
Approval, 29 No. 3 FED. LITIGATOR 8, Westlaw (Mar. 2014).  
 104. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(r) (2012). 
 105. See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 1, at 11 n.39 (quoting MASTERCARD INT’L, MERCHANT 
RULES MANUAL, BYLAW 9.12.2 (2006) (“A merchant must not directly or indirectly require 
any MasterCard cardholder to pay a surcharge or any part of any merchant discount or any 
contemporaneous finance charge in connection with a MasterCard card transaction.”)). 
 106. $100,000 x 3.25% (MasterCard World Elite Standard Rate) + $0.10 (per-transaction 
fee) = $3,250.10. 
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requiring buyers using other payment methods to subsidize the fee. 
American Express107 and Discover108 have “piggyback” 109 rules, requiring a 
merchant who surcharges any cards to surcharge all cards. 
2. No-Discount Rules 
A discount is a reduction from the regular price.110 In the past, 
contractual no-discount rules prohibited merchants from offering 
discounted prices based on the payment method used. Congress amended 
the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) in 1974 to require networks to allow 
merchant discounting, subject to proper disclosure and an arbitrary 5% 
cap.111 Congress removed this cap in 1981,112 and in 2010, the Durbin 
Amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act removed networks’ restrictions on 
discounting credit cards at the network level such that credit-card 
companies can no longer prohibit merchants from discounting their 
cards.113 Permitting discounts only at the network level means that 
merchants can discount certain payment methods (e.g., discounting cash 
payments but not credit cards) but cannot discount based on a particular 
issuer or card type (e.g., discounting all Visa credit cards but not 
discounting MasterCards). For example, a merchant incurring a $3 credit-
card-processing fee could discount a television from $100 to $97 for 
Customer A who pays with cash instead of a credit card. However, under 
no-surcharge rules, a merchant cannot impose a surcharge on Customer B’s 
                                                                                                                 
 107. American Express Reference Guide, supra note 71, at 14 (“Merchants must not . . . 
impose any restrictions, conditions, disadvantages or fees when the Card is accepted that are 
not imposed equally on all Other Payment Products . . . .”). 
 108. Merchant Operating Regulations, DISCOVER 6 (Oct. 15, 2010), http://www.indy 
host.net/images/surcharge/Discover-Operating-Regulations-4-2011.pdf (“[Y]ou may not . . . 
provide[] unequal and unfavorable treatment [to] any Person who elects to pay using a Card . . . 
and you may not in any way discriminate among various Issuers of Cards . . . .”) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 109. Levitin, supra note 1, at 11 n.39 (using the term “piggy-back”). 
 110. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(q) (2012). The term “regular price” means “the tag or posted price 
charged for the property or service if a single price is tagged or posted, or the price charged 
for the property or service when payment is made by use of an open-end credit plan or a 
credit card if either (1) no price is tagged or posted, or (2) two prices are tagged or posted, 
one of which is charged when payment is made by use of an open-end credit plan or a credit 
card and the other when payment is made by use of cash, check, or similar means.” Id. § 
1602(y). 
 111. Fair Credit Billing Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 306, 88 Stat. 1500, 1515. 
 112. Cash Discount Act, Pub. L. No. 97-25, § 101, 95 Stat. 144, 144 (1981). 
 113. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(b)(3)(A)-(B) (2012). 
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credit-card purchase of the same $100 television and make the full price 
$103.  
3. Honor-All-Cards Rules 
 “Honor-all-cards” rules require a merchant who accepts any card from a 
particular credit-card network to accept all cards bearing that name, 
regardless of the issuing bank or interchange fee.114 For example, under 
contracts with Visa, “merchants must accept all categories of Visa debit, 
credit, and prepaid cards.”115 A merchant who accepts a low interchange-fee 
card from Customer B must accept a high interchange-fee card from 
Customer C. In the past, honor-all-cards provisions required merchants that 
accepted a brand’s debit cards to also accept its credit cards.116 However, 
because of a settlement with Wal-Mart, Sears, and other retailers in 2003, 
merchants now do not have to accept a Visa or MasterCard credit card 
simply because they accept a Visa or MasterCard debit card.117  
4. Anti-Steering and Nondisclosure Rules 
Some contracts prohibit merchants from using price signals at the point 
of sale to steer customers to other payment systems with less expensive 
fees.118 Steering would be considered an expression of preference for or 
against a certain network, brand, product, or payment type. After antitrust 
settlements and lawsuits brought by the Department of Justice,119 Visa,120 
and MasterCard121 now allow some steering. American Express is currently 
                                                                                                                 
 114. In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986 F. Supp. 
2d 207, 214 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) appeal filed, no. 14-241 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 115. Visa Acceptance Guidelines, supra note 95, at 9; see also MasterCard Rules, 
MASTERCARD Bylaw 5.8.1, at 83 (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.mastercard.com/us/merchant/ 
pdf/BM-Entire_Manual_public.pdf [hereinafter MasterCard Rules]. 
 116. Adam J. Levitin, Payment Wars: The Merchant-Bank Struggle for Control of 
Payment Systems, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 425, 433 n.26 (2007). 
 117. See In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503, 508 
(E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 118. In re Payment Card Interchange, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 215. 
 119. See Chad Bray, Visa, MasterCard Win Approval of Settlement in ‘Anti-Steering’ 
Case, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2011; see also United States v. Am. Express Co., No. CV-10-
4496(NGG)(RER), 2015 WL 728563, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). While defendants Visa and 
MasterCard settled their claims in that case, American Express did not and is still litigating 
its claims. As a result, Visa explicitly permits steering while American Express expressly 
prohibits steering.  
 120. Visa Acceptance Guidelines, supra note 95, at 9. 
 121. MasterCard Rules, supra note 115, at 215. 
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litigating antitrust steering claims brought by the Department of Justice122 
and still prohibits merchant steering.123  
5. No-Minimum and No-Maximum Purchase Rules 
No-minimum/no-maximum rules prevent merchants from declining to 
accept credit cards on particularly low- or high- dollar-amount 
transactions.124 Small-ticket and small-margin transactions result in less 
profit for merchants when a customer uses a credit card or debit card 
because of the flat transaction fee.125 Suppose a customer purchases a $0.25 
item at a convenience store and pays with a Visa Signature Preferred card. 
The default rate for small-ticket items purchased with a Visa Signature 
Preferred card is 2.10% plus $0.10.126 Assuming the purchase occurs in a 
city with 9.0% state and local sales taxes,127 the transaction leaves the 
merchant with around $0.15 after accounting for only the flat interchange 
fee and sales tax.128 Considering the cost of the item, other transaction fees, 
and overhead, the merchant will almost certainly lose money accepting 
credit cards on small-ticket transactions. Networks’ contractual no-
minimum rules forced merchants to lose money by accepting credit cards 
on small-ticket items. As with no-discount rules, the Dodd-Frank Act limits 
contractual restrictions on no-minimum purchase rules, freeing merchants 
to set a minimum credit-card purchase of up to $10.129  
                                                                                                                 
 122. See Melissa Lipman, Judge Urges DOJ, AmEx to Pursue Antitrust Settlement, 
LAW360 (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/568752/judge-urges-doj-amex-to-
pursue-antitrust-settlement; see also Am. Express Co., No. CV-10-4496(NGG)(RER), 2015 
WL 728563. 
 123. See, e.g., American Express Reference Guide, supra note 71, at 14 (“Merchants 
must not . . . indicate or imply that they prefer, directly or indirectly, any Other Payment 
Products over our Card, . . . [nor] try to persuade or prompt Cardmembers to use any Other 
Payment Products or any other method of payment (e.g., payment by check) . . . .”). 
 124. Levitin, supra note 116, at 436. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Visa USA Fees, supra note 46, at 4. 
 127. The average state and local sales tax was 9.6% in 2012. William P. Barrett, Average 
U.S. Sales Tax Rate Drops—A Little, FORBES (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
williampbarrett/2012/02/02/average-u-s-sales-tax-rate-drops-a-little/. 
 128. $0.25 + 9% tax = $0.27. 
($0.27 - $.10 flat interchange fee) - $0.02 tax = $0.15. 
 129. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(b)(3)(A) (2012). 
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As the name suggests, no-maximum rules130 prevent merchants from 
setting a maximum amount for a credit-card transaction. Suppose a 
pecunious customer has saved $30,000 in cash to purchase a new car but 
would rather use his credit card in order to accrue the substantial reward 
points he stands to gain. The average dealer profit over invoice might only 
be $1000-$1500131 on this purchase, assuming incentives and manufacturer-
to-dealer cash have not reduced the purchase price below invoice already.132 
With an interchange fee of just 3%, $900 of the estimated $1000-$1500 
profit goes exclusively to credit-card-acceptance fees. One can see why 
many merchants would favor setting a maximum limit on credit-card 
purchases.  
The Dodd-Frank Act provides no relief for merchants regarding no-
maximum rules, though it permits federal agencies and institutes of higher 
learning to set maximum allowable credit-card amounts.133 
B. Visa and MasterCard Terminate Their No-Surcharge Policy: In re 
Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation 
A lawsuit filed in 2005134 eventually morphed into a putative class action 
containing approximately twelve million large and small merchant-
members who alleged that Visa and MasterCard, as well as issuing and 
acquiring banks, conspired to fix interchange fees in violation of section 1 
of the Sherman Act.135 After nearly eight years of litigation on several 
consolidated cases, Visa, MasterCard, and the class plaintiffs agreed to 
settle the case in 2012.136 Judge John Gleeson of the Eastern District of 
                                                                                                                 
 130. See, e.g., Minimum Transaction Amount on a Visa Credit Card, VISA USA (2013), 
http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/minimum-transactions-credit-card.pdf (“Only federal 
agencies or institutions of higher education can impose a maximum transaction amount.”). 
 131. Allie Johnson, Buying a Car with a Credit Card Often an Uphill Fight, 
CREDITCARDS (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/buying-car-
with-credit-card-1280.php. 
 132. 10 Steps to Buying a New Car, KELLEY BLUE BOOK, http://www.kbb.com/car-
advice/car-buying/step-5-know-when-the-price-is-right/?r=857748394366353800 (last visited 
Feb. 12, 2015). Kelley Blue Book notes that the average dealer mark-up over invoice is less 
than 10% on new cars, which, compared with other industries, is “quite low.” Id. 
 133. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2012). 
 134. Complaint, Photos Etc. Corp. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., No. 3:05-CV-01007 (D. Conn. 
Jun. 22, 2005). 
 135. In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986 F. Supp. 
2d 207, 213 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), appeal filed, No. 14-241 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 136. Settlement Agreement, supra note 12, ¶¶ 42, 55. 
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New York approved the settlement in December 2013.137 The terms of the 
settlement included the following: 
! $7.25 billion claim settlement138 (believed to be the largest 
antitrust settlement in history).139  
! Rule modifications to permit merchants to surcharge on Visa or 
MasterCard credit cards at both the brand level (e.g., all Visa or 
MasterCards) and product levels (e.g., only Visa Signature cards 
or MasterCard World Elite cards).140 Surcharges must be 
disclosed before they are incurred and on a receipt.141 
! Obligations on the part of Visa and MasterCard to negotiate 
interchange fees in good faith.142 
! Merchants operating multiple businesses may now accept Visa 
and/or MasterCard at fewer than all of their businesses.143 
! Permanent implementation of the reforms in the Durbin 
Amendment144 and the Department of Justice’s consent decree 
with Visa and MasterCard,145 even if those reforms are repealed 
or otherwise undone.146  
  
                                                                                                                 
 137. In re Payment Card Interchange, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 241. 
 138. Settlement Agreement, supra note 12, ¶¶ 9-10, 11-13. 
 139. David McAfee, $7.25B Visa, MasterCard Swipe Fee Deal Gets Approval, LAW360 
(Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/495780/7-25b-visa-mastercard-swipe-fee-
deal-gets-approval; Christie Smythe, Visa, MasterCard Judge Asked to Approve Settlement, 
Fees, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-12/visa-
mastercard-judge-asked-to-approve-settlement-fees.html.  
 140. Settlement Agreement, supra note 12, ¶¶ 42, 55. 
 141. In re Payment Card Interchange, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 234. 
 142. Settlement Agreement, supra note 12, ¶¶ 43, 56. 
 143. Id. ¶¶ 41, 54. 
 144. The Durbin Amendment, inter alia, removes merchant restrictions on discounting at 
the network level and permits setting minimum credit-card purchases of up to $10.00. See 15 
U.S.C. § 1693o-2(b)(3)(A)-(B) (2012). 
 145. A 2010 DOJ investigation ended in consent decrees in which Visa and MasterCard 
agreed to permit product-level discounting of credit and debit cards. In re Payment Card 
Interchange, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 215. 
 146. Settlement Agreement, supra note 12, ¶¶ 40, 44, 53, 57. 
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Many unsatisfied class merchants, including half of the top one hundred 
retailer-class members147 like Wal-Mart, Home Depot, and Amazon.com, 
have appealed the decision to the Second Circuit.148 Appellants’ most 
relevant arguments for present purposes involve default interchange rules, 
honor-all-cards rules, and no-surcharge rules.  
Appellants first argue that the combination of networks’ honor-all-cards 
rules and default interchange rules violate antitrust laws and that the 
settlement offers no relief in these areas “whatsoever.”149 One of the terms 
of the settlement is a mandatory release of all future injunctive and damages 
claims against Visa or MasterCard on topics related to the suit.150 Objecting 
merchants claim that the networks have therefore “purchased . . . 
immunity” in the $7 billion settlement, barring all future claims involving 
the controversial honor-all-cards and default interchange rules.151 “Far from 
enjoining the restrictive rules at issue, . . . this Settlement expressly ratifies 
both rules for all time.”152 Judge Gleeson noted that plaintiffs would have a 
difficult time proving that default interchange rules violate antitrust laws 
and that “default interchange rules played an essential role in the 
construction of the networks at issue here, and those networks provide 
substantial benefit to both merchants and consumers.”153  
Regarding honor-all-cards rules, Judge Gleeson determined that these 
rules are not anticompetitive, but are actually procompetitive, given the 
complex credit-card system comprised of thousands of issuing banks, 
thousands of acquiring banks, and millions of merchants.154 The need for a 
seamless card acceptance in the form of honor-all-cards rules, he 
determined, is integral to the success of the networks.155 Honor-all-cards 
practices previously required merchants accepting a Visa or MasterCard 
                                                                                                                 
 147. Another Interchange Opt-Out Lawsuit, NILSON REP. (HSN Consultants, Inc., 
Carpinteria, Cal.), July 2013, at 5. 
 148. See In re Payment Card Interchange, No. 14-241 (2d Cir. filed Jan. 22, 2014). 
 149. Brief for National Retail Federation at 3, In re Payment Card Interchange, No. 14-
00663 (2d Cir. June 16, 2014). 
 150. Settlement Agreement, supra note 12, ¶¶ 40, 44, 53, 57. 
 151. The Merchant Trade Groups’ Reply Brief at 4, In re Payment Card Interchange, No. 
14-00663 (2d Cir. Feb 14, 2014). 
 152. Id.  
 153. In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merc. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986 F. Supp. 2d 
207, 227 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) appeal filed, No. 14-241 (2d Cir. 2014); see also supra notes 117-
118 and accompanying text.  
 154. In re Payment Card Interchange, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 228. 
 155. Id.  
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debit card to also accept all of that brand’s credit cards, but these practices 
were ended as terms of another class action antitrust settlement in 2003.156 
Another potential problem with the settlement is that by its terms, “[i]f 
another more expensive network brand that the merchant accepts continues 
to restrict surcharging, the merchant may not surcharge Visa and 
MasterCard without also surcharging transactions on that competitor 
network.”157 The plain language of this “level-playing field”158 provision 
leads to a dilemma: American Express159 and Discover160 have piggyback 
rules that force a merchant who surcharges any card to surcharge all cards 
equally. The interplay between the different networks’ rules means that a 
merchant who surcharges a Visa or MasterCard transaction but does not 
surcharge an American Express or Discover transaction operates in 
violation of American Express or Discover piggyback provisions. But a 
merchant imposing surcharges uniformly across credit-card networks 
operates in violation of no-surcharge provisions of American Express, 
Discover, and the terms of the settlement. Merchants are left to either not 
surcharge any credit-card transaction, effectively rendering these rule 
changes in the settlement useless, or surcharge Visa and MasterCard 
transactions and terminate contracts with American Express and Discover. 
Thus, lifting contractual no-surcharge prohibitions provides no effective 
relief for 90% of merchants (based on card volume) who accept American 
Express and Discover.161  
Fortunately for merchants, American Express and Discover appear to 
have agreed to end their no-surcharge provisions—American Express 
pursuant to the terms of a pending settlement in a different class-action 
lawsuit 162 and Discover pursuant to the terms of an agreement to drop the 
                                                                                                                 
 156. See In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503, 508 
(E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 157. In re Payment Card Interchange, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 234. 
 158. Id. 
 159. American Express Reference Guide, supra note 71, at 14 (“Merchants must not . . . 
impose any restrictions, conditions, disadvantages or fees when the Card is accepted that are 
not imposed equally on all Other Payment Products . . . .”). 
 160. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 161. Brief for National Retail Federation at 4, In re Payment Card Interchange, No. 14-
00663 (2d Cir. June 16, 2014). 
 162. Press Release, Am. Express, American Express Agrees to Settle Class Action 
Litigations (Dec. 19, 2013), http://about.americanexpress.com/news/pr/2013/amex-agrees-
to-settle-class-action.aspx. 
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company as a party in the Payment Card Interchange case.163 Thus, the 
piggyback objection appears moot, except in the event that one network 
caps its surcharge allowance, effectively capping surcharges on all cards. 
For example, if Discover were to permit only a surcharge up to 2%, the 
level-playing field provision would permit a merchant the ability to 
surcharge only up to 2% on Visa, MasterCard, or American Express as 
well.  
In their last objection, appellants argue that statutes in nine states 
(including the four most populous states)164 prohibit merchant 
surcharging,165 so contractual relaxing of no-surcharge provisions provides 
no relief for merchants in these states or national merchants conducting 
business in these states.  
Judge Gleeson notes that the level-playing field and state-law objections 
“place[] in sharp relief the limited extent to which the problems merchants 
complain about in this industry can be addressed in a single lawsuit.”166 
Merchants cannot expect a settlement involving Visa and MasterCard to 
confer new obligations upon non-party networks like American Express 
and Discover. Additionally, Judge Gleeson stated that he cannot preempt 
state law with this settlement,167 but optimistically noted that a federal court 
in New York recently found that state’s no-surcharge statute 
unconstitutional, perhaps signaling a trend among states diminishing these 
laws.168 Judge Gleeson seems to have been incorrect in this prediction, 
however, as the Second Circuit recently vacated the New York opinion,169 
and courts in Florida170 and Texas171 have recently upheld the validity of 
their states’ no-surcharge statutes.  
                                                                                                                 
 163. Discover to Drop “No Surcharge” Ban, GREEN SHEET, http://www.greensheet. 
com/gs_archive.php?issue_number=060301&story=9 (last visited Feb. 15, 2015); see also 
Merchant Surcharge Notification Form, DISCOVER, https://www.discoversurcharge.com (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2015). 
 164. See table infra note 198. 
 165. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 166. In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merc. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986 F. Supp. 2d 
207, 233 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), appeal filed, No. 14-291 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 167. Id. at 219. 
 168. Id. at 232-33.  
 169. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, No. 13-4533, 2015 WL 5692296, at *1 
(2d Cir. Sept. 29, 2015). 
 170. Clerk’s Judgment, Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Bondi, No. 4:14-cv-00134 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 
5, 2014) (order entered Sept. 2, 2014). 
 171. Final Judgment, Rowell v. Pettijohn, No. 1:14-cv-00190 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2014) 
(order entered Feb. 4, 2015). 
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Regarding the Second Circuit’s review of the settlement approval, it is 
worth noting that in 2003, the same circuit affirmed a settlement approved 
by Judge Gleeson in a similar Visa and MasterCard class-antitrust case.172 
Similar objections existed in that appeal, but the Second Circuit affirmed 
the settlement approval as “substantively fair” under an abuse-of-discretion 
standard.173 Even if this settlement is not preserved in its entirety through 
the appeals process, the trend is clearly in favor of credit-card networks 
ending their contractual no-surcharge provisions. 
III. Statutory Merchant Restraints 
A. Federal Law 
The Federal prohibition against surcharging and discounting began with 
the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) in 1968.174 Congress amended TILA in 
1974 to permit cash discounts of no more than 5% as long as merchants 
properly disclose the discount.175 The surcharge prohibition had a sunset 
provision, which Congress renewed twice. One renewal came by way of the 
Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978 
(FIRIRCA)176 and another in 1981 through the Cash Discount Act.177 In 
1984, however, Congress allowed the sun to set on the surcharge 
prohibition.178  
In 1981, the Senate committee argued that the policy behind the federal 
surcharge ban was consumer protection:179 “consumers cannot be lured into 
an establishment on the basis of the ‘low, rock-bottom price’ only to find at 
the cash register that the price will be higher if a credit card is used.”180 The 
consumer-protection basis for these laws has drawn both skepticism and 
complete rejection for two significant reasons.  
                                                                                                                 
 172. In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503, 507 (E.D.N.Y. 
2003). 
 173. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 117, 124 n.12 (2d Cir. 
2005). 
 174. Pub. L. No. 90-321, tit. 1, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1601-1667(f) (2012)). 
 175. Fair Credit Billing Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 306, 88 Stat. 1500, 1515. 
 176. Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 1501, 92 Stat. 3641, 3713 (two-year extension).  
 177. Pub. L. No. 97-25, § 201, 95 Stat. 144, 144 (1981) (three-year extension). 
 178. S. REP. NO. 97-23, at 3 (1981); Cash Discount Act § 201, 95 Stat. at 144 (sunset on 
February 27, 1984). 
 179. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 975 F. Supp. 2d 430, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013). 
 180. S. REP. NO. 97-23, at 4 (1981). 
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First, many consider the distinction between a discount and a surcharge 
dubious181 or nonexistent.182 One may ask why, if mathematically identical, 
would credit-card companies oppose a surcharge when the freedom to 
discount based on payment type is protected by federal law? The answer 
lies with a psychological phenomenon known as “loss aversion,” which 
indicates (perhaps intuitively) that “‘changes that make things worse 
(losses) loom larger than improvements or gains’ of an equivalent 
amount.”183 Similarly, the “framing effect” demonstrates that framing a 
price differential as a discount receives far less negative customer reaction 
than framing a price differential as a surcharge.184 “Because of the framing 
effect, surcharges are far more effective than discounts at signaling to 
consumers the relative costs of a payment system.”185 Put another way, a 
surcharge above the retail price is more likely to frustrate customers away 
from credit card use than a discounted price is to entice them towards 
paying with cash. With discounts and surcharges being economically equal, 
however, critics question186 the logic behind the traditional prohibition 
against surcharges while the ability to discount remains protected by 
statute.187 
Second, consumer advocates and numerous federal agencies, including 
the Federal Trade Commission, “[u]nanimous[ly] dissent[ed] . . . against 
extending the ban on surcharges.”188 They argued “state and federal no-
surcharge laws . . . were enacted in the name of consumer protection at the 
behest of the credit-card industry over the objection of consumer 
advocates.”189 Various merchants have alleged that Visa and MasterCard 
even created and funded a “fake” consumer protection group called 
                                                                                                                 
 181. Id. at 15 (comment of Sen. Dalton) (“In any event, the actual difference between a 
discount and surcharge is unclear, and we believe it would be anomalous to allow one and 
not the other.”). 
 182. Expressions, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 436 (“In terms of their immediate economic 
consequences, surcharges and discounts are merely different labels for the same thing—a 
price difference between cash and credit.”). 
 183. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, No. 13-4533, 2015 WL 5692296, at *1 
(2d Cir. Sept. 29, 2015) (quoting Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment 
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 199 (1991)). 
 184. Adam J. Levitin, The Antitrust Super Bowl: America’s Payment Systems, No-
Surcharge Rules, and the Hidden Costs of Credit, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 265, 280 (2005). 
 185. Id. at 282 (emphasis omitted). 
 186. See supra notes 180-182 and accompanying text. 
 187. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(b)(3)(A)-(B) (2012); Cash Discount Act, Pub. L. No. 
97-25, § 102, 95 Stat. 144, 144 (1981). 
 188. S. REP. NO. 97-23, at 10 (1981) (comments of Sen. Proxmire). 
 189. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 975 F. Supp. 430, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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“Consumers Against Penalty Surcharges” to support state and federal no-
surcharge prohibitions in response to “real” consumer advocacy group 
opposition.190 Some federal legislators considering the Cash Discount Act 
called no-surcharge laws “special interest legislation” for legislators’ 
“friends in the credit card industry” and “costing the American people 
billions of dollars.” 191  
Federal legislators allowed the surcharge ban to sunset in 1984, and 
merchants can now discount or surcharge without violating federal law.192 
The current law, however, only expressly protects merchants’ ability to 
discount. Accordingly, networks and states cannot restrict merchants’ 
ability to discount but may still freely restrict merchant surcharging.  
B. State Law  
As a result of heavy lobbying by credit-card companies in the 1980s,193 
nine states currently prohibit credit-card surcharging by statute: California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Massachusetts, New York, 
Oklahoma, and Texas,194 as listed in Table 1 (Appendix). Like federal no-
surcharge statutes, the purported policy behind these state statutes is 
consumer protection.195 The fact that federal law permits surcharging has 
been held not to preempt state no-surcharge laws.196 
The no-surcharge-rule changes that occurred as a result of the Visa, 
MasterCard, American Express, and Discover agreements clearly do not 
provide surcharge relief for merchants in these states. As Judge Gleeson 
noted in In re Payment Card Interchange, “[T]he state laws prohibiting 
                                                                                                                 
 190. Corrected Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 
No. 13-4533 at 12 (2d Cir. 2014); Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Italian Colors Rest. v. Harris, No. 2:14-cv-00604, at 6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 
5, 2014).  
 191. S. REP. NO. 97-23, at 9-10 (1981) (comments of Sen. Proxmire). 
 192. 15 U.S.C. § 1666f (2012).  
 193. Expressions, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 439. 
 194. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1748.1(a) (West Supp. 2015) (found unconstitutional in 
Italian Colors Rest. v. Harris, No. 2:14-cv-00604 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2014)); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 5-2-212(1) (2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-133ff(a) (2013); FLA. STAT. § 
501.0117(1) (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-2-403 (2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
140D, § 28A(a)(2) (West 2012); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518 (McKinney 1984); 14A OKLA. 
STAT. § 2-211 (2011); 14A OKLA. STAT. § 2-417 (2011); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 339.001(a) 
(West Supp. 2014). 
 195. Expressions, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 449. 
 196. People v. Fulvio, 135 Misc. 2d 93 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1987). 
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surcharging . . . are real, and they in fact undermine to an extent the 
immediate utility of the rules reforms in the proposed settlement.”197  
Perhaps more importantly, heavy lobbying successfully orchestrated 
these no-surcharge statutes in states with the highest populations.198 States 
with no-surcharge statutes make up only 20% of the states in the United 
States, but they collectively contain 40% of the U.S. population according 
to the 2010 United States Census.199 Indeed, the top four states in terms of 
population—California, Texas, New York, and Florida, respectively—all 
passed no-surcharge statutes. Since most national merchants are generally 
located in the most populous cities in these states, these national merchants 
see a significant number of transactions subject to state no-surcharge 
prohibitions. For example, First Data Corporation (FDC), merchant-
appellant in the Visa and MasterCard settlement, points out that the states 
                                                                                                                 
 197. In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986 F. Supp. 
2d 207, 219 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 198. The following table illustrates the state population of states with no-surcharge 
statutes as a percentage of U.S. Population in 2010. 
 
State Population Rank Percentage of U.S. Population 2010 Population 
California 1 12.07 37,253,956 
Texas 2 8.14 25,145,561 
New York 3 6.28 19,378,102 
Florida 4 6.09 18,801,310 
Massachusetts 14 2.12 6,547,629 
Colorado 22 1.63 5,029,196 
Oklahoma 28 1.22 3,751,351 
Connecticut 29 1.16 3,574,097 
Kansas 33 0.92 2,853,118 
Maine 41 0.43 1,328,361 
Total 40% 123,662,681 
 
Data taken from United States Census 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census. 
gov/2010census/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2015). 
 199. Id.  
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that prohibit “the passing of fees onto consumers for use of credit cards . . . 
account[] for over 77% of FDC’s credit-card transactions.”200 
Only one state expressly protects credit-card surcharging by statute. 
Since 1987, Minnesota has allowed surcharging, subject only to the 
condition that the merchant fully disclose any surcharge to consumers.201 
This statute was largely ineffective in the face of contractual no-surcharge 
rules, but now that Visa and MasterCard have eliminated those rules, this 
statute offers renewed significance.  
1. Inconsistent Federal District Court Adjudication of State No-
Surcharge Statutes 
In 2012, five retailers sued the New York Attorney General and district 
attorneys of three counties challenging the constitutionality of New York 
General Business Law section 518,202 which prohibited any seller in sales 
transactions from imposing a surcharge, or “swipe fee,” on a cardholder 
using a credit card instead of another payment method.203 In an opinion 
highly critical of state no-surcharge laws, Judge Rakoff held that the statute 
was both an unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech and was void 
for vagueness.204 
Commercial speech generally triggers intermediate scrutiny, and courts 
consider: 
(1) whether the regulated speech concern[s] lawful activity and 
[is] not . . . misleading, (2) whether the asserted governmental 
interest justifying the regulation is substantial, (3) whether the 
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, 
and (4) whether the regulation is not more extensive than is 
necessary to serve the governmental interest.205 
The Southern District of New York determined that New York’s statute 
violated merchants’ First Amendment protection of commercial speech 
                                                                                                                 
 200. Objectors-Appellants First Data Corporation et al. Page Proof Opening Brief at 40, 
In re Payment Card Interchange, No. 14-00663 (2d Cir. June 16, 2014), 2014 WL 2794831. 
 201. See MINN. STAT. § 325G.051 (2012). 
 202. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518 (McKinney 2015) (“No seller in any sales transaction 
may impose a surcharge on a holder who elects to use a credit card in lieu of payment by 
cash, check, or similar means. Any seller who violates the provisions of this section shall be 
guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars or a term of 
imprisonment up to one year, or both.”). 
 203. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 975 F. Supp. 2d 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 204. Id. at 448; see also supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 205. Expressions, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 445 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
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because the difference between a “surcharge” and a “discount” exists 
“based on words and labels, rather than economic realities. So read, the 
statute clearly regulates speech, not conduct, and does so by banning 
disfavored expression.”206 For the court, liability therefore turned merely on 
the content of the merchant’s speech used to describe effectively identical 
conduct. Responding to New York’s argument that setting price is speech 
but communicating price is conduct, Judge Rakoff stated, “Pricing is a 
routine subject of economic regulation, but the manner in which price 
information is conveyed to buyers is quintessentially expressive, and 
therefore protected by the First Amendment.”207  
Additionally, the court determined that the statute was far broader than 
necessary and did not directly advance any interest in protecting consumers 
from deception.208 To the contrary “the statute actually perpetuates 
consumer confusion by preventing sellers from using the most effective 
means at their disposal to educate consumers about the true costs of credit 
card usage.”209 The defendants also could not justify the numerous 
exceptions to the law, like exempting the State of New York itself and 
exempting certain favored utilities from the law.210 Finally, the no-
surcharge law was far broader than necessary to serve any antifraud 
purpose, as New York could have simply limited the ban to only deceptive 
or misleading surcharges or passed a law similar to Minnesota’s, which 
permits surcharging only upon proper disclosure.211  
While challenges involving commercial speech generally trigger 
intermediate scrutiny, courts apply the strictest scrutiny to vague laws when 
those vagaries implicate constitutional protections.212 A law can be void for 
vagueness under the Due Process Clause if it either (1) “fails to provide 
people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what 
conduct it prohibits,” or (2) “authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.”213 The Expressions court cited People v. 
Fulvio,214 in which a New York criminal court held that it was “intolerable” 
that a gasoline station operator who is careful enough to state that a lower 
                                                                                                                 
 206. Id. at 444. 
 207. Id. at 445. 
 208. Id. at 446. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id.  
 211. Id. at 447. 
 212. Id. at 448. 
 213. Id. (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 705 (2000)). 
 214. 517 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1015 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1987). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss2/4
2016]       COMMENT 357 
 
 
price is a “discount for cash” “may enter his automobile at the end of his 
business day and drive home a free man,” but if a gas station operator or his 
employee simply describes a higher price as a “credit price,” “he faces the 
prospect of criminal conviction and possible imprisonment.”215 Plaintiffs in 
Expression raised a simple yet significant question regarding state no-
surcharge statutes: what can merchants lawfully tell their customers?216 “If 
a customer asks us whether we charge more for paying with a credit 
card . . . should we ignore or dodge the question? Are we required to 
answer falsely?”217 Recognizing the constitutional significance of these 
problems, and the fact that there is no effective difference between a 
surcharge and a discount, the Expressions court held that New York’s no-
surcharge statute was void for vagueness.218  
The court also decided that merchants plausibly alleged that New York’s 
no-surcharge law violates the rule of reason.219 This is because state no-
surcharge bans like New York’s are “indistinguishable from the bans that 
Visa and MasterCard recently dropped from their retailer contracts as part 
of an antitrust settlement” and because of the dubiousness of consumer 
protection aims of no-surcharge rules.220  
Expressions has nationwide significance because New York’s section 
518 employs almost the exact same language as many other states’ no-
surcharge statutes.221 Indeed, after Expressions, merchants filed lawsuits in 
at least three other states (California, Texas, and Florida)222 challenging the 
constitutionality of their no-surcharge statutes.223 Under virtually the exact 
analysis in Expressions, the Eastern District of California deemed 
                                                                                                                 
 215. Expressions, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 448 (quoting Fulvio, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 1015). 
 216. Corrected Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 53, Expressions Hair Design v. 
Schneiderman, No. 13-4533 (2d Cir. June 24, 2014). 
 217. Id.  
 218. Expressions, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 448. 
 219. Id. at 449. 
 220. Id.  
 221. See Appendix I. 
 222. See Italian Colors Rest. v. Harris, No. 2:14-cv-00604 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2014); 
Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Bondi, No. 4:14-cv-00134 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2014); Rowell v. 
Pettijohn, No. 1:14-cv-00190 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2014).  
 223. Kelly Knaub, Fla., Calif. Retailers Fight No-Surcharge Credit Card Laws, LAW360 
(Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/515881/fla-calif-retailers-fight-no-
surcharge-credit card-laws; Elizabeth Warmerdam, ‘Surcharge’ Bans Challenged in Three 
Major States, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.courthousenews.com/ 
2014/03/07/65915.htm.  
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California’s no-surcharge statute unconstitutional in Italian Colors.224 
Contrary to these decisions, courts in Florida225 and Texas226 recently 
dismissed challenges to their no-surcharge statutes with prejudice.227 All of 
these cases were appealed to their respective circuit courts.228 
Florida’s no-surcharge law is very similar to New York’s in that it 
imposes criminal liability on a merchant operating in violation of the 
statute.229 In a relatively brief230 district court order accepting the arguments 
rejected in New York, Judge Hinkle applied the rational-basis test and 
found Florida’s no-surcharge statute constitutional because “the statute 
[was] within the Florida Legislature’s broad discretion in regulating 
economic affairs.”231 Preventing “at least a small measure of bait and 
switch” that occurs when a merchant applies a surcharge at the point of sale 
was a “legitimate legislative goal.”232  
Judge Hinkle also rejected plaintiffs’ void-for-vagueness arguments in 
Dana’s Railroad Supply, supplying an unsettlingly brief analysis: “Nor 
have I overlooked the plaintiffs’ assertion that the statute is impermissibly 
vague. It is not. The core of the statute is clear, and it clearly applies to the 
plaintiffs’ pricing of their products.”233 
                                                                                                                 
 224.  Italian Colors Rest. v. Harris, No. 2:14-CV-00604-MCE, 2015 WL 1405507 (E.D. 
Cal. Mar. 26, 2015). 
 225. Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Bondi, No. 4:14-cv-00134 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2014). 
 226. Rowell v. Pettijohn, No. 1:14-cv-00190 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2014).  
 227. Clerk’s Judgment, Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Bondi, No. 4:14-cv-00134 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 
5, 2014) (order entered September 2, 2014). 
 228. Italian Colors Rest. v. Harris, appeal docketed, No. 15-15873 (9th Cir. Apr 30, 
2015); Rowell v. Pettijohn, appeal docketed, No. 15-50168 (5th Cir. Feb. 26, 2015); Dana’s 
R.R. Supply v. Att’y Gen., appeal docketed, No. 14-14426 (11th Cir. Sept. 30, 2014); 
Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, appeal docketed, No. 13-04537 (2d Cir. Dec 03, 
2013). 
 229. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.0117(2) (2014) (“A person who violates the 
provisions of subsection (1) is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree.”) with N.Y. 
GEN. BUS. LAW § 518 (McKinney 2015) (“Any seller who violates the provisions of this 
section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not to exceed five hundred 
dollars or a term of imprisonment up to one year, or both.”). 
 230. Compare the six-page analysis of Florida’s no-surcharge law in Dana’s Railroad 
Supply with Expressions Hair Design’s twenty-page analysis of New York’s no-surcharge 
law or the seventeen-page analysis of California’s law in Italian Colors.  
 231. Order Granting Summary Judgment at 2, Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Bondi, No. 4:14-
cv-00134 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2014). 
 232. Id. at 3-4. 
 233. Order Granting Summary Judgment at 6, Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Bondi, No. 4:14-
cv-00134 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2014). 
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Similarly, the Western District of Texas “decline[d] to adopt or follow 
the Expressions court’s analysis and reasoning,” rejecting First Amendment 
application and applying the rational-basis test to determine that Texas’ no-
surcharge statute falls within state police power.234 
2. The Circuit Split Between the Second and Eleventh Circuits 
In late 2015, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s decision in 
Expressions and determined that New York’s no-surcharge statute did not 
violate the First Amendment’s free-speech guarantee and was not void for 
vagueness under the Due Process Clause.235 Rejecting plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment arguments, the court determined that the statute regulates 
conduct, not speech, and therefore free-speech guarantees were not 
implicated.236 The court cited precedent that affirmed the validity of price-
control statutes which “necessarily prevent sellers from communicating 
certain (illegal) prices.”237 Thus, “If prohibiting certain prices does not 
implicate the First Amendment, it follows that prohibiting certain 
relationships between prices also does not implicate the First 
Amendment.”238 Concluding that section 518 simply regulates conduct (by 
banning the setting of a difference between a seller’s sticker price and the 
ultimate price that the seller charges credit-card customers), the court 
determined that the First Amendment free-speech guarantee was simply not 
implicated.239  
Regarding plaintiffs’ void-for-vagueness arguments under the Due 
Process Clause, the court applied the strict rule that “a law is facially 
unconstitutional only if it is ‘impermissibly vague in all of its 
                                                                                                                 
 234. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss at 6, Rowell v. Pettijohn, No. 1:14-cv-00190-LY 
(W.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2015). 
 235. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, No. 13-4533, 2015 WL 5692296, at *1 
(2d Cir. Sept. 29, 2015). 
 236. Id. at *8-10. 
 237. Id. at *8, 10; see, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1876) (“[It] has been 
customary . . . in this country from its first colonization, to regulate ferries, common carriers, 
hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, & c., and in so doing to fix a maximum 
of charge to be made for services rendered, accommodations furnished, and articles sold.”); 
Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. City of Providence, R.I., 731 F.3d 71, 77 (1st Cir. 
2013) (“[P]rice regulations and other forms of direct economic regulation do not implicate 
First Amendment concerns.”). But cf. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, 
Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006) (stating that laws that exclusively regulate conduct may 
nonetheless implicate the First Amendment in cases where the conduct at issue is “inherently 
expressive”). 
 238. Expressions, 2015 WL 5692296, at *9. 
 239. Id.  
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applications.’”240 Given this rule, “‘If a statute has a core meaning that can 
reasonably be understood, then it may validly be applied to conduct within 
the core meaning, and the possibility of such a valid application necessarily 
means that the statute is not vague on its face.’”241 Because New York 
enacted its no-surcharge ban to mirror the federal ban after the federal 
statute lapsed, and the lapsed federal no-surcharge statute had a clear core 
meaning, the court determined that New York’s no-surcharge statute had “a 
core meaning that can be reasonably understood”: sellers cannot post a 
single price for goods or services and then increase the price at the register 
by surcharging.242 
The court indicated one way in which New York merchants might 
implement a surcharge while still complying with the statute. On its face, 
the statute only applies to single-sticker-price sellers. The court expressly 
abstained from deciding whether the statute violated the First Amendment 
guarantees of dual-sticker-price sellers.243 The court noted that at least 
under a Due Process void-for-vagueness analysis, the statute would 
“clearly” not prevent plaintiffs from imposing a dual-price regime if New 
York courts interpreted the state statute as identical to the lapsed federal 
statue.244 This is because the lapsed federal statute expressly defined the 
“regular price” to include both prices in a dual-pricing regime.245 No 
surcharge is imposed at the register, and therefore no violation of the statute 
has occurred. New York’s statute does not expressly define “regular price” 
as the federal statute did so the court declined to reach the issue on the 
merits, but the court noted that if New York courts interpreted the statue the 
same way or if the legislature clarified the definition as Congress did, 
merchants could implement dual-pricing regimes.246 Ultimately, the court 
vacated the lower opinion and determined that New York’s no-surcharge 
                                                                                                                 
 240. Id. at *17 (emphasis added) (quoting Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman 
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982)). 
 241. Expressions, 2015 WL 5692296, at *17 (quoting Brache v. Westchester County, 658 
F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1981)). 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id.  
 244. Id. at *19. 
 245. See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(y) (2012) (“The term ‘regular price’ means the tag or posted 
price charged for the property or service if a single price is tagged or posted, or the price 
charged for the property or service when payment is made by use of an open-end credit plan 
or a credit card if either (1) no price is tagged or posted, or (2) two prices are tagged or 
posted, one of which is charged when payment is made by use of an open-end credit plan or 
a credit card and the other when payment is made by use of cash, check, or similar means.”) 
 246. Expressions, 2015 WL 5692296, at *17.  
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statute did not violate the First Amendment’s free-speech guarantee and 
was not void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause. 
Two months after the Second Circuit’s opinion in Expressions, the 
Eleventh Circuit created a circuit split when it struck down Florida’s no-
surcharge law as “an unconstitutional abridgment of free speech.”247 
Rejecting Judge Hinkle’s rational-basis analysis, the court undertook an 
analysis similar to that of the district court in Expressions to determine that 
the no-surcharge law regulated speech—not conduct—and therefore the 
rational-basis test did not apply.248 This was because, to the Eleventh 
Circuit, the statute did not prohibit dual-pricing, or charging different prices 
depending on the method of payment; it only prohibited merchants from 
describing the price difference as a “surcharge” instead of a “discount.”249 
“Calling § 501.0117 a ‘no-surcharge law,’ then, is something of a 
misnomer. The statute targets expression alone. More accurately, it should 
be a ‘surcharges-are-fine-just-don’t-call-them-that law.’”250 
 Like the district court in Expressions, the Eleventh Circuit posed an 
entertaining hypothetical to demonstrate the dubious difference between a 
“discount” and a “surcharge”: 
After all, what is a surcharge but a negative discount? If the 
same copy of Plato’s Republic can be had for $30 in cash or $32 
by credit card, absent any communication from the seller, does 
the customer incur a $2 surcharge or does he receive a $2 
discount? Questions of metaphysics aside, there is no real-world 
difference between the two formulations. Accordingly, Florida’s 
no-surcharge law is a restriction on speech, not a regulation of 
conduct.251 
 The court then analyzed and rejected four purported state interests: 
1. The purported interest advanced by the Attorney General—a 
generalized interest in “consumer protection.” 
2. The law may serve as an antifraud measure against bait-and-
switch tactics, whereby a merchant advertises a lower price 
only to later charge a higher price. 
                                                                                                                 
 247. Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Att’y Gen., Fla., No. 14-14426, 2015 WL 6725138, at *1 
(11th Cir. Nov. 4, 2015). 
 248. Id. at *6.  
 249. Id. at *2. 
 250. Id. at *5. 
 251. Id. at *6. 
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3. The law may be viewed as a prophylactic measure that 
protects consumers against “unpleasant surprises” that do not 
rise to the level of fraud.  
4. The law may be seen as leveling the playing field among 
merchants, some of whom may otherwise select a policy of 
assessing credit-card surcharges while others opt for cash 
discounts. 252 
To the Eleventh Circuit, the purported “consumer protection” interest was 
“formulated too abstractly to provide a meaningful benchmark for weighing 
the no-surcharge law against the State’s purported interest.”253 The 
remaining justifications were inadequate to support the burden of 
demonstrating that the statute advances any potentially substantial state 
interest or is narrowly tailored.254 These interests “would be better served 
by direct and focused regulation of actual pricing behavior.”255 The court 
ultimately determined that the no-surcharge statute was unconstitutional 
regardless of whether intermediate or strict scrutiny applied because no 
justification given or contemplated was sufficient to abridge merchant’s 
free speech.256  
 The dissent in the case makes clear, “The majority places our circuit in 
direct conflict with our sister circuit on this issue.”257 Other appeals are 
currently pending before the Fifth and Ninth Circuits on the 
constitutionality of no-surcharge laws in Texas and California.258 At its 
core, resolution of this split turns on whether these statutes implicate the 
First Amendment by unconstitutionally infringing on commercial-free 
speech or whether they merely regulate conduct. If the First Amendment 
                                                                                                                 
 252. Id. at *9.  
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at *10. 
 255. Id. (“Florida could simply prohibit dual-pricing altogether. Or it could cap the 
difference in price that can be charged to customers paying with cash and those using credit 
cards, just as it has done for the use of credit cards at state agencies and for the use of a 
‘money transmitter service.’ Or it could ban specific false and deceptive trade practices, such 
as bait-and-switch tactics, as it does generally for acts of unfair competition under the State’s 
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. Or it could require merchants to disclose to their 
customers the workings of their pricing policy.”) (citations omitted).  
 256. Id. at *2. 
 257. Id. at *13 (Carnes, C.J., dissenting). 
 258. Rowell v. Pettijohn, appeal docketed, No. 15-50168 (5th Cir. Feb. 26, 2015) 
(appealing district court’s finding that Texas’ no-surcharge law is constitutional); Italian 
Colors Rest. v. Harris, appeal docketed, No. 15-15873 (9th Cir. Apr 30, 2015) (appealing 
district court’s finding that California’s no-surcharge law is unconstitutional).  
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applies, courts should clarify which level of scrutiny applies. Time will tell 
whether the Supreme Court will grant certiorari to decide these issues. The 
breadth, gravity, timeliness make the constitutionality of no-surcharge laws 
ripe for review, though the Court will likely wait until the issue percolates 
and the Fifth and Ninth Circuits decide their appeals. Given (1) the clear 
circuit split, (2) the number of merchants affected, (3) the number of 
citizens affected, (4) the billions of dollars in commerce that are implicated, 
(5) the number of states considering new no-surcharge laws, and (6) the 
recent contractual changes in the industry that now permit surcharging, 
Supreme Court review is imperative to finally resolve this area of the law. 
3. Recently Proposed Legislation in Several States 
In the wake of networks’ no-surcharge policy changes, at least eighteen 
states have considered state no-surcharge bans.259 No-surcharge lobbying 
similar to that which occurred in the 1980s seems to be in full effect after 
Visa and MasterCard agreed to end their contractual no-surcharge 
prohibitions. Arkansas, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and West 
Virginia all considered some kind of no-surcharge law from 2012 to 
2013.260 Currently, Utah has been the only state to actually pass a recent no-
surcharge statute.261 Legislators decided, however, not to extend the law 
past its one-year sunset provision, so merchants may currently surcharge in 
Utah.262 Legislators also expressly eliminated the no-surcharge prohibition 
in proposed legislation.263 
C. Recent Industry Reform in Foreign Markets 
The largest western countries have outpaced the United States with 
regard to merchant restraints and the regulation of the credit-card industry. 
The United States can observe the impact of industry reforms in foreign 
markets to determine not only whether reform is necessary, but also the 
                                                                                                                 
 259. Wack, supra note 17. 
 260. See Credit or Debit Card Interest, Surcharges, and Fees 2013 Legislation, NAT’L 
CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/ 
credit-or-debit-card-surcharges-2013-legis.aspx (last visited Aug. 31, 2015). 
 261. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-38a-302 (West 1953) (repealed).  
 262. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63I-1-213 (2014). 
 263. H.B. 330, 2014 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2014), http://le.utah.gov/~2014/bills/hbillint/ 
hb0330.pdf (“This bill[] repeals sections that prohibit a seller from imposing a surcharge on 
a transaction for $10,000 or less that is paid for by using a credit card . . . .”). 
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efficacy and interplay between various reform measures. These 
observations foreshadow the potential impact on domestic reform. 
1. Australia 
Australia has seen the most dramatic developments in these areas264 and 
provides the “most complete experiment to date with regulating interchange 
fees.”265 After a 1998 law enabled the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) to 
regulate payment systems “in the public interest,” the RBA announced new 
rules designed to improve efficiency, transparency, and competition.266 One 
of the first reforms was the abolition of no-surcharge rules that networks 
imposed on merchants.267 These reforms also included RBA regulation of 
interchange fees, resulting in an estimated reduction of interchange fees in 
Australia by $400 million (Australian) per year, or nearly 50%.268 In 2013, 
the RBA imposed further reforms improving surcharge-price signaling to 
customers and eliminating potential surcharge gouging by allowing 
networks to limit surcharges to “the reasonable cost of acceptance.” 269 The 
reasonable cost of acceptance includes, but is not limited to, the merchant-
discount fee paid to the merchant bank.270  
A 2010 RBA study found that almost 30% of merchants now surcharge 
at least one of the credit cards they accept, up from around 8% just three 
years prior.271 The study also found that almost half of consumers that hold 
a credit card now seek to avoid incurring a surcharge by using a different 
payment method.272 This addresses concerns that even if permitted to 
                                                                                                                 
 264. Pierre V.F. Bos, International Scrutiny of Payment Card Systems, 73 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 739, 739 (2006). 
 265. Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Payment Card Interchange Fees and Limits of 
Regulation, INT’L CTR. FOR L. & ECON., at iii (2010), http://www.laweconcenter.org/images/ 
articles/zywicki_interchange.pdf. 
 266. Bos, supra note 264, at 739-40. 
 267. Id. at 740. 
 268. Id. at 741. 
 269. Reforms to Payment Card Surcharging, FED. RES. BANK AUSTL. (Mar. 18, 2013), 
http://www.rba.gov.au/payments-system/surcharging/index.html. 
 270. Id. 
 271. John Bagnall et al., Strategic Review of Innovation in the Payments System: Results 
of the Reserve Bank of Australia’s 2010 Consumer Payments Use Study, FED. RES. BANK 
AUSTL. 16 (June 2011), http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/consultations/201106-strategic-
review-innovation/results/pdf/201106-strategic-review-innovation-results.pdf. Supermarkets 
and department stores did not tend to surcharge in 2010. Id. at 18. 
 272. Id. at 25. 
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surcharge, merchants would not choose to do so,273 and it also demonstrates 
that consumers will indeed elect alternative payment methods based on 
surcharges.  
2. European Union 
Merchants in the United Kingdom have had the freedom to surcharge 
credit-card transactions since a 1991 statutory instrument made contractual 
no-surcharge and no-discount rules illegal.274 In late 2014, the European 
Parliament entered into an agreement with the European Council to impose 
sweeping new regulations on the credit-card industry.275 The European 
Commission determined that consumers ultimately suffer by paying higher 
prices for transactions because of the “hidden” interchange fees that 
merchants are forced to pay but “[n]either retailers nor consumers can 
influence.”276 Instead of allowing networks to set interchange fees, the 
European Commission will now study and regulate interchange fees, 
abolish traditional “honor-all-cards” practices, and establish rules for 
greater transparency.277  
These regulations were prompted by a 2007 European Commission 
decision against MasterCard that deemed its cross-border interchange fees 
an unfair violation of European Union Antitrust rules for “inflat[ing] the 
cost of card acceptance.”278 That decision was affirmed in 2014 by a 
                                                                                                                 
 273. See, e.g., Steven Semeraro, The Reverse-Robin-Hood-Cross-Subsidy Hypothesis: 
Do Credit Card Systems Tax the Poor and Reward the Rich?, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 419, 436 
(2009); Martha C. White, A 4% Surcharge for Using a Credit Card?! Now Legal—but Not 
Likely, TIME (Jan. 25, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/01/25/a-4-surcharge-for-using-
a-credit-card-legal-but-not-likely/. 
 274. Credit Cards (Price Discrimination) Order 1990, SI 1990/2159 (U.K.). 
 275. Press Release, European Comm’n, Commission Welcomes Political Agreement 
Reached by European Parliament and Council on Capping Inter-bank Fees for Card-based 
Payments (Dec. 17, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-2767_ 
en.htm [hereinafter Commission Welcomes Political Agreement]. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Prohibits MasterCard’s 
Intra-EEA Multilateral Interchange Fees (Dec. 19, 2007), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-07-1959_en.htm?locale=fr [hereinafter Commission Prohibits MasterCard’s 
Fees]. 
Similarly, in 2005, the United Kingdom’s Office of Fair Trade conducted a lengthy 
inquiry into the practices of MasterCard UK, resulting in a decision that MasterCard UK’s 
interchange fees violated both the European Commission Treaty Article 81 and the 
Competition Act of 1998. See Press Release, Office of Fair Trading, MasterCard Agreement 
Anti-Competitive, Rules OFT (Sept. 6, 2005), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ 
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European Court of Justice judgment,279 and the announcement of reforms to 
the entire industry followed shortly thereafter. Not simply curative or 
retributive, the European regulation also contains a preventative component 
that removes much of the uncertainty around interchange fees in emerging 
areas like online, mobile, and person-to-person transactions to prepare the 
market for technological innovation.280  
IV. Surcharging Credit-Card Transactions in the United States After 
Landmark Changes 
Currently, merchants may surcharge credit cards at the point of sale 
without violating federal law. Merchants may also surcharge without being 
in violation of contractual obligations with Visa and MasterCard provided 
that they (1) provide Visa and MasterCard thirty days’ notice that they 
intend to surcharge; (2) disclose the surcharge at the point of sale; and (3) 
disclose the surcharge on the customer’s receipt.281 A surcharge cannot 
exceed the actual cost of the merchant-discount fee, and Visa and 
MasterCard prohibit merchants from setting any fee above 4%, even if the 
actual cost of acceptance exceeds 4%.282 Merchants are also able to 
surcharge Discover and American Express credit-card transactions.283 As of 
date of publication, merchants cannot surcharge in Colorado, Connecticut, 
Kansas, Massachusetts, New York, Oklahoma, or Texas pursuant to state 
no-surcharge statutes. The following sections discuss arguments for and 
against surcharging and consider possible legislative action that would 
                                                                                                                 
20131101202531/http:// www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2005/168-05, See also 
Decision No. CA 98/05/05, Office of Fair Trading, Investigation of the Multilateral 
Interchange Fees Provided for in the UK Domestic Rules of MasterCard UK Members Forum 
Limited, Case No. CP/0090/00/S (Sept. 6, 2005), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ 
20140402142426/http://www.oft. gov.uk/shared_oft/ca98_public_register/decisions/ 
mastercard.pdf;jsessionid=6FF02D2689FA2A679783A2BA941602CF. 
 279. Case C-382/12 P, Mastercard v. Comm’n, E.C.J. (Sept. 11, 2014), http://curia. 
europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=157521&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&m
ode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3927. 
 280. Commission Welcomes Political Agreement, supra note 275. 
 281. Settlement Agreement, supra note 12, ¶ 42(c). 
 282. Merchant Surcharging Considerations and Requirements, VISA USA, https://usa.visa. 
com/dam/VCOM/download/merchants/surcharge-considerations-and-requirements.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2015); What Merchant Surcharge Rules Mean to You, MASTERCARD, 
https://www.mastercard.us/en-us/merchants/get-support/merchant-surcharge-rules.html (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2015). 
 283. See supra notes 162-163 and accompanying text.  
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allow market forces to guide interchange fees while furthering consumer-
protection objectives. 
A. Arguments in Favor of Surcharging Credit-Card Transactions  
1. Allowing Credit-Card Surcharging Will Reduce Consumer 
Indebtedness as Consumers Shift Purchases from Credit to Other Forms 
of Payment 
The increase of consumer debt and bankruptcy filings “present[s] a new 
impetus to reexamine no-surcharge rules and their influence on consumer 
payment system choices.”284 Congress has recognized the negative effects 
of credit-card debt on individuals and the economy at large285 and has 
passed numerous pieces of legislation to reduce consumer debt and 
bankruptcies. These efforts include the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA),286 the Credit Card 
Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009,287 and 
the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.288 Commenting on consumer bankruptcy 
filing reforms under BAPCPA, Professor Charles J. Tabb noted, “[I]f 
Congress really wants to slow or even reverse the increase in bankruptcy 
filings, the real target should be the underlying cause—credit card debt—
and not the bankruptcy law itself.”289 Signing the Dodd-Frank Act, 
President Obama called creditor practices “abusive” and noted that 
Americans often get “caught by hidden fees and penalties, or saddled with 
loans they can’t afford.”290 Senator Chris Dodd, the architect of the CARD 
Act, stated, “The whole business model of the credit card industry is not 
designed to extend credit but to induce mistakes and trap consumers into 
                                                                                                                 
 284. Levitin, supra note 184, at 284.  
 285. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 111-88, at 10 (2009) (“The accumulation of large amounts 
of credit card debt can have profound implications on individual consumers and the 
economy more generally.”); S. REP. NO. 111-16, at 4 (2009). 
 286. Bankruptcy Abuse and Prevention Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). 
 287. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 
111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2004). 
 288. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 289. Charles J. Tabb, Consumer Filings: Trends and Indicators (pts. 1 & 2), 25 AM. 
BANKR. INST. J. 1, 1 (2006), 25 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 42, 100 (2007). 
 290. Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President at Signing of Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 2010), reprinted in 2010 
U.S.C.C.A.N. S26, S27. 
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debt.”291 Consumer credit-card debt leads to increased consumer credit 
defaults, increased bankruptcy filings, decreased savings, and decreased 
purchasing power from inflation.292  
The CARD Act’s stated purpose was “to implement needed reforms and 
help protect consumers by prohibiting various unfair, misleading and 
deceptive practices in the credit card market.” 293 Examples of protections 
include prohibiting creditors from unilaterally changing the terms of 
cardholder agreements governing outstanding balances,294 prohibiting 
increases in a cardholder’s interest rate for failing to make timely payments 
to a different creditor,295 and prohibiting creditors from charging multiple 
over-limit fees for multiple infractions within the same billing cycle.296  
While these reforms largely provided debt relief at the credit-card-issuer 
level and reformed bankruptcy filings, controlling merchant restraints can 
ameliorate the problem at perhaps the most important level: the point of 
sale. This is achieved by discouraging credit card use in the first instance. 
“[A]vailable evidence suggests that consumers will likely respond to 
surcharges by using a less costly payment system.”297 For example, the 
2010 study by the Reserve Bank of Australia found that almost half of 
consumers opted for a less expensive alternative when faced with a 
surcharge.298 After Australian credit industry reforms, “The rate of growth 
for credit card spending dropped to its lowest level since the RBA began 
gathering data in the early 1990s, while the rate of growth for debit card 
spending rose to its highest level since 1999.”299 A shift away from credit 
card use in favor of cash or debit card use to evade a surcharge can solve 
                                                                                                                 
 291. 155 CONG. REC. SR5313, SR5314 (daily ed. May 11, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Dodd). 
 292. See Levitin, supra note 1, at 43-51. 
 293. S. REP. NO. 111-16, at 2 (2009). But see RENUART & KEEST, supra note 76, § 
2.3.2.3.2 (2011 Supp.) (“The CARD Act was designed to rein in some of these abuses, but 
already creditors are finding ways to circumvent the Act’s limitations.”). 
 294. 15 U.S.C. § 1666i-1(c)(1) (2012). 
 295. Id. § 1666i-1(a)-(b) (excluding defaults on other credit accounts as a reason for 
increasing interest rates, effectively ending prior “universal default” rules). See Mary Beth 
Matthews, The Credit CARD Act of 2009—Four Years Later, 2013 ARK. L. NOTES 1488, http:// 
media.law.uark.edu/arklawnotes/2013/08/23/the-credit-card-act-of-2009-four-years-later/. 
 296. 15 U.S.C. § 1637(k)(7) (2012). 
 297. Mann, supra note 36, at 222 (analyzing how check surcharges at the point of sale in 
Norway led to increased debit card use as a cheaper alternative). 
 298. Discussed at supra Part III.C.1. 
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many of the problems associated with the overuse of credit cards, 
strengthening the economy in the process.  
2. No-Surcharge Rules Create a Cross-Subsidy, Forcing the Poorest 
Americans to Subsidize Rewards Programs  
No-surcharge rules do not allow credit-card users to internalize the 
higher rates merchants pay, preventing reward cards users from “pay[ing] 
their own way.”300 “Price coherence” shows that retail prices generally 
remain the same at a retail location regardless of the payment method 
used.301 The only relief for merchants who cannot or will not absorb these 
fees from profits is to pass on the costs of credit-card-interchange fees to all 
consumers by raising prices across the board. “To the extent that credit 
cards are a high-cost payment method to merchants, then all consumers 
supply the funds that are collected by merchants and paid as interchange 
fees.”302 The current arrangement creates a “cross-subsidy of credit card 
consumers by non-credit card consumers, and of reward-card consumers by 
consumers not using rewards cards.”303 Because the poorest Americans do 
not have access to high-reward credit cards and tend to be cash-only 
customers, this cross subsidy is highly regressive.304 “In its worst form, 
food stamp consumers are subsidizing first-class frequent flier upgrades.”305 
Professor Steven Semeraro labels this occurrence as “The Reverse-Robin-
Hood-Cross-Subsidy.”306 
A recent Federal Reserve Bank of Boston policy paper notes that “[o]n 
average, each cash buyer pays $149 to card users and each card buyer 
receives $1,133 from cash users every year, a total transfer of $1,282 from 
the average cash payer to the average card payer.”307 The Senate committee 
hearings recognized the cross-subsidy in advocating against a federal no-
surcharge law when considering the Cash Discount Act.308 The committee 
                                                                                                                 
 300. Levitin, supra note 54, at 1356.  
 301. Frankel & Shampine, supra note 9, at 632.  
 302. Id.  
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 305. Levitin, supra note 9, at 1356. But see Semeraro, supra note 273, at 419 (criticizing 
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stated that allowing surcharges “would provide a mechanism by which cash 
customers could be relieved of subsidizing credit-card users.”309  
3. Surcharges Are Procompetitive, Facilitating a More Efficient 
Economy  
Surcharge prohibitions disincentivize competition among acquiring 
banks (and ultimately networks) from setting interchange fees as low as the 
market will tolerate. Most merchants clearly must accept cards, as card use 
surpassed check use by 2003 and cash use long before that.310 With 
surcharges in place, banks and networks have an incentive to keep their 
merchant-discount fees low. This incentive is absent today because these 
fees are concealed from consumers and therefore insulated from the 
competition in a free market. Surcharging “allows market forces to operate 
on the previously invisible (to customers) array of interchange fees, and 
will exert downward pressure on those fees by injecting a form of 
competition the current rules have prohibited.”311 This can eventually lower 
prices as merchants pass the savings from the embedded costs onto the 
consumer. As Professor Schmalensee notes, “In the short run, if you 
drastically reduce interchange fees retailers will make more money,” but 
customers will see embedded cost savings “passed through in the long 
run.”312 In addition to lowering prices, surcharging can lead to job creation 
as merchants are either able to recover the fees they once paid by 
surcharging or are relieved of the surcharge altogether when a customer 
uses another payment method that is less costly to the merchant.  
B. Arguments Against Credit-Card Surcharging 
1. Consumers May Turn Away from Merchants That Impose a Surcharge  
Consumers may withdraw from merchants who surcharge credit-card 
transactions that were once not only free, but also accrued reward points. 
When confronted with a surcharge at the point of sale, consumers may 
direct their disapproval toward the merchant than toward the credit-card 
                                                                                                                 
effect of subsidizing credit-card users at the expense of cash paying customers, many of 
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company, as most consumers lack a comprehensive understanding of the 
intricate credit-card networks and payment systems.313 Consider a market 
wherein Target elects to surcharge credit-card transactions, but Wal-Mart 
opts to absorb the fees as operational costs or embed the cost and increase 
prices across the board. Wal-Mart’s action would conceal the fees from 
consumer disapproval, while Target’s fees would be transparent.314 
Merchants clearly take a competitive risk when deciding whether to impose 
a surcharge.  
The consumer withdrawal objection entails another objection—that 
merchants will refuse to surcharge even given the opportunity. “[T]oday’s 
retail landscape is hypercompetitive, so many stores will be hesitant to risk 
alienating customers by charging extra for using plastic.”315 Research in 
foreign markets provides mixed results. An article weighing credit 
surcharges on American Express’s small business Open Forum warns that 
up to 90% of New Zealand customers would “rather leave the store than 
pay more due to a credit card surcharge.”316 A public relations firm, 
however, performed this study, and its sponsor was unnamed.317 On the 
other hand, the official study performed by the Reserve Bank of Australia 
concluded that consumers would not altogether abandon their purchase 
from a merchant when presented with a surcharge, but half of consumers 
would simply elect a different form of payment at the point of sale that does 
not incur a surcharge.318  
These objections rely on the assumption that their solution is the 
continuation of surcharge prohibitions. However, that a consumer elects 
with her dollars a non-surcharging merchant should not preclude all 
merchants’ freedom to surcharge if they so decide. Since the consumer 
protection aims of no-surcharge prohibitions have largely lost their 
validity,319 deference should be given to the business judgment of 
                                                                                                                 
 313. See Schuh et al., supra note 2. 
 314. Wal-Mart and Target have actually both vowed not to impose a surcharge/checkout 
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individual merchants, given their knowledge of the unique demands of their 
industry. This is especially true in a marketplace wherein merchants must 
accept cards in order to operate, but are forced to pay artificially inflated 
interchange fees that are insulated from market discipline. The current 
prohibitions particularly harm small-margin merchants like those running 
grocery or convenience stores. In practice, some merchants will surcharge 
and others will not, but the ability to surcharge itself provides merchants 
with a powerful tool to combat the high credit-card-interchange fees that 
are currently insulated from market discipline.  
2. Consumers May Reduce Credit-Card Spending, Harming Merchants 
Some estimates indicate that consumers spend more when using credit 
instead of cash—sometimes almost twice as much.320 Merchants have an 
interest in minimizing the effect of interchange fees, but the interest in 
increasing sales may trump the interest in minimizing interchange fees. A 
customer’s decision to purchase one $100 item with cash or two $100 items 
on credit certainly informs a merchant’s decision of whether to implement a 
surcharge policy or not. This point requires a deviation from the general, 
merchant-based justifications discussed thus far in favor of social welfare 
and market efficiency justifications, though there are tangential benefits to 
merchants.  
Arguments in favor of increased consumer-credit spending, of course, 
require as a premise that consumer credit-card debt is a positive component 
of the economy—a premise that many reject.321 To the extent that 
merchants suffer a decrease in sales as consumers shift from credit to debit 
or cash purchases, merchants enjoy a stronger and more efficient economy 
overall. The economy as a whole benefits by surcharging because it 
disincentivizes credit purchases in favor of debit or cash purchases thereby 
decreasing consumer indebtedness.322 Numerous acts demonstrate that 
Congress places an emphasis on reducing consumer indebtedness for the 
benefit of the overall economy.323 
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3. Surcharge Prohibitions Protect Against Consumer Confusion and 
Frustration 
The initial consumer protection ambitions that existed upon the 
enactment of no-surcharge statutes may exist as possible objections to 
surcharging today—namely, that “consumers cannot be lured into an 
establishment on the basis of ‘low, rock-bottom price’ only to find at the 
cash register that the price will be higher if a credit card is used.”324 
However, a customer should be no more surprised at the register by a 
surcharge than she is when she proceeds to the register with a $5 item, only 
to discover that there is a $10 minimum for credit-card purchases, as the 
Dodd-Frank Act now permits.325 
Additionally, as surcharging becomes more common, the consumer-
protection aims that were intended to protect against price differentials at 
the point of sale will dissolve. As consumers become more aware of 
surcharges for credit-card transactions, there will no longer be any 
“surprise” at the register. Just as consumers have become conditioned to 
accept varying state and local taxes, varying minimum transaction price 
rules under the Durbin Amendment, or “convenience” and other fees 
permitted on online and telephone purchases, consumers will undoubtedly 
learn to anticipate the possibility of a surcharge when they elect a credit 
card over another form of payment.  
 Furthermore, many of the state statutes that prohibit surcharging allow 
surcharges for some transactions, such as when a governmental entity,326 
university,327 or utility company328 processes a payment. If consumers are 
being protected from seeing a lower price initially only to be informed of a 
higher credit-card price at the point of sale, this protection would seem to 
be of equal concern regardless of whether the customer is transacting with 
their government, utility company, university, or in a merchant’s store. The 
Eleventh Circuit recently employed this reasoning when it found Florida’s 
no-surcharge law unconstitutional: “If customers would be harmed by 
learning that they faced surcharges but not discounts from private 
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merchants, creating an exception allowing the State to impose convenience 
fees betrays the frailty of any potential state interests.”329 One may even feel 
more aggrieved or “taken advantage of” when she finds that the credit-card 
price differential at checkout was imposed by her own government or 
university.  
Some argue that a new stratum of consumer confusion would be created 
under a surcharge regime because “different cards will have different 
surcharges, . . . customers will have to keep track of not only which stores 
charge them but also how much using each card would set them back.”330 
This is, however, procompetitive almost by definition, and the industry can 
expect to see “credit card promotions touting low- or no-surcharge 
transactions to become part of banks’ marketing mix, similar to what we’ve 
seen with the gradual rollback of foreign transaction fees on many new card 
offers.”331  
4. Merchants Will Take Advantage of Consumers by Surcharging in 
Excess of the Actual Cost of Acceptance 
Finally, proponents of surcharge prohibitions argue merchants will set 
surcharges such that they exceed the actual cost of acceptance and 
extracting a windfall from consumers.332 In a footnote in Expressions, the 
Second Circuit even referred to this occurring in Australia when it legalized 
surcharging, though this is the only footnote for which the court provided 
no authority.333  
A review of the briefs submitted in that case reveals that these arguments 
originated in the brief of the Attorney General of New York.334 Citing 
Australian sources, appellant argued, “sellers in places that permit credit-
card surcharges have frequently recouped more than the fair cost of credit-
card services by imposing surcharges that far exceed the merchant-discount 
fees.”335 Critically, and apparently unnoticed by the Second Circuit was the 
fact that the sources cited for these propositions predate Australia’s 2013 
fee-regulation reforms. As discussed in Part III.C.1 above, the RBA 
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imposed reforms that eliminated surcharge gouging by allowing networks 
to limit surcharges to “the reasonable cost of acceptance.”336 While some 
merchants in the past may have been free to set surcharges at any amount, 
any surcharge over the actual cost of acceptance would now put merchants 
in direct violation of their contracts with credit-card companies.337 Apart 
from being based on outdated sources, this objection hastily and unfairly 
assumes that merchants will breach their contracts. 
V. Actions That Permit Surcharging While Furthering Consumer Protection 
Objectives 
With contractual no-surcharge rules lifted in In re Payment Card 
Interchange Fee and other agreements, and with federal law no longer 
prohibiting credit-card surcharges, the only legal restraints for merchants 
wishing to impose a surcharge are state statutes. The fact that we have wholly 
inconsistent court decisions indicates that the courts offer merchants no 
uniform and absolute relief from interchange fees. This is understandable, as 
courts reiterate that their role is simply to adjudicate the constitutionality of 
state statutes like these, and that “The wisdom of the policy choices animating 
[them] is not for us to judge.”338 Accordingly, the following methods can 
protect consumers and merchants alike by permitting limited surcharging.  
The most complete and efficacious solution requires congressional action. 
With the CARD Act, the Durbin Amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act, etc., 
Congress has made clear that it has the ability and often the duty to intervene 
in the credit-card industry on behalf of merchants and consumers. 
Accordingly, Congress could protect the ability of merchants to surcharge 
credit transactions much as it protected merchants’ ability to discount in the 
1980s with the Cash Discount Act339 or merchants’ ability to set minimum 
prices under the Durbin Amendment.340 The United States should look to 
foreign markets that permit merchant surcharging for guidance. Many of 
these countries regard network-established-interchange fees as antitrust 
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violations, even after the laws changed to protect merchants’ freedom to 
surcharge.341  
For a true solution to the interchange-fee problem, the freedom to 
surcharge must operate in tandem with federal regulation of credit-card-
interchange fees. Inquiries into the regulation of credit-card-interchange fees 
in foreign markets along with inquiries into domestic-market performance 
after debit-card-interchange-fee regulation can inform these decisions. 
Regulation of debit-card-interchange fees in the United States now occurs as 
part of the Durbin Amendment,342 which demonstrates that regulation of 
credit-card-interchange fees is an achievable aim. A Federal Reserve Board 
Study found that while the average debit-card-interchange fee was $0.44, it 
only costs $0.10 or less to process the transaction.343 Recall that these fees 
were insulated from market forces, and not even the federal government 
could convince networks to negotiate lower fees.344 A 2013 study by 
economist Robert Shapiro found that debit-card-interchange-fee regulation 
under the Durbin Amendment “saved consumers and merchants an estimated 
$8.5 billion in 2012,” with $5.87 billion, or around 70%, passed along to 
consumers in lower prices.345 These lower prices led to more consumption, 
and Shapiro estimates that this consumption, coupled with higher retained 
earnings, supported the creation of some 37,501 new jobs in the United States 
in 2012.346 Federal legislation should expressly limit any surcharge to “the 
reasonable cost of acceptance” and mandate proper disclosure to consumers. 
In lieu of federal action, state legislatures could repeal their respective no-
surcharge statutes given the anticompetitive and arguably unconstitutional 
nature of no-surcharge statutes. States could also follow Minnesota’s lead and 
permit surcharging conditioned upon proper disclosure.347 Minnesota’s no-
surcharge statute properly balances consumer and merchant protections by 
requiring merchants who decide to surcharge to clearly disclose the surcharge 
to customers. Section 325G.051(a) of the Minnesota Statutes provides that a 
merchant can surcharge provided (1) the seller informs the purchaser of the 
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surcharge both orally at the time of sale and by a sign conspicuously posted 
on the seller’s premises, and (2) the surcharge does not exceed 5% of the 
purchase price. This statute gives merchants the freedom to surcharge but 
ensures that customers are fully aware when making a purchase. This 
customer awareness, in turn, brings to the surface the once-hidden surcharges 
so that customers can decide whether to incur the fee or not, de-insulating the 
higher fees from market forces. Further, the ability to surcharge gives 
merchants some degree of leverage, perhaps collectively, in negotiating 
interchange fees and merchant-discount rates. 
Conclusion 
The clear trend among the major credit-card networks, even if influenced 
by court order or class-action settlement, is in favor of allowing merchants to 
surcharge the reasonable cost of acceptance and conditioning surcharges on 
proper disclosure. The largest foreign markets permit surcharging and 
regulate credit-card-interchange fees. Merchants should be empowered to use 
their business judgment to determine whether to pass along the high costs of 
credit-card payments to those using credit cards instead of spreading the cost 
among all customers or absorbing them from their own profits. The ultimate 
solution likely requires the regulation of credit-card-interchange fees similar 
to the current regulation of debit-card-interchange fees.  
Consumer protection should not be achieved in this area by state 
regulation at the merchant-level through no-surcharge statutes. These statutes 
punish merchants, not credit-card companies, and force merchants to incur 
artificially inflated interchange fees that are insulated from free-market 
principles. Regulation of this area should focus on the practices of credit-card 
companies and banks, whose conduct has already been considered antitrust 
violations in the United States and internationally. “There is nothing wrong 
with fees charged for services provided, as long as those fees are transparent 
and are set in a competitive market environment. Don’t tell me you are for a 
free market and then say but Visa and MasterCard can fix prices.”348  
 
Samuel J. Merchant 
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TABLE 1: STATE NO-SURCHARGE STATUTES 
(Current Jan. 2015) 
 
STATE STATUTE SURCHARGE NOTES 
California 
CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 1748.1(a) 
(West 2006). 
“No retailer in any sales, 
service, or lease transaction 
with a consumer may 
impose a surcharge on a 
cardholder who elects to 
use a credit card in lieu of 
payment by cash, check, or 
similar means.” 
Permits utility company 
surcharging. Held 
unconstitutional and 
enforcement enjoined in 
Italian Colors Rest. v. 
Harris, No. 2:14-CV-
00604-MCE, 2015 WL 
1405507 (E.D. Cal. 
Mar. 26, 2015), appeal 
filed, Case No. 15-
15873 (9th Cir. Filed 
Apr. 30, 2015). 
Colorado 
COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 5-2-212 
(2014). 
“[N]o seller or lessor in any 
sales or lease transaction or 
any company issuing credit 
or charge cards may impose 
a surcharge on a holder who 
elects to use a credit or 
charge card in lieu of 
payment by cash, check, or 
similar means.” 
 
Connecticut 
CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 42-
133ff(a) (2013). 
“No seller may impose a 
surcharge on a buyer who 
elects to use any method of 
payment, including, but not 
limited to, cash, check, 
credit card or electronic 
means, in any sales 
transaction.” 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-
133ff(b) (2013) provides 
a statutory “Honor-all-
cards” rule; CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 42-133ff(d) 
(2013) permits a 
minimum credit-card 
purchase amount. 
Florida 
FLA. STAT. § 
501.0117(1) 
(2014). 
“A seller or lessor in a sales 
or lease transaction may not 
impose a surcharge on the 
buyer or lessee for electing 
to use a credit card in lieu 
of payment by cash, check, 
or similar means, if the 
seller or lessor accepts 
payment by credit card.” 
Permits “convenience 
fee” for payments to an 
eligible college 
institution. Found 
unconstitutional in 
Dana’s R.R. Supply v. 
Att’y Gen., Fla., No. 14-
14426, 2015 WL 
6725138 (11th Cir. Nov. 
4, 2015).  
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STATE STATUTE SURCHARGE NOTES 
Kansas 
KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 16a-2-
403 (West 
2010). 
“No seller or lessor in any 
sales or lease transaction or 
any credit or debit card 
issuer may impose a 
surcharge on a card holder 
who elects to use a credit or 
debit card in lieu of 
payment by cash, check or 
similar means.” 
 
Maine 
ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 9-A, § 
8-509 (2014). 
“A seller in a sales 
transaction may not impose 
a surcharge on a cardholder 
who elects to use a credit 
card or debit card in lieu of 
payment by cash, check or 
similar means.” 
Permits a governmental 
entity to impose a 
surcharge. 
Massachusetts 
MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 140D 
§ 28A (2012). 
“No seller in any sales 
transaction may impose a 
surcharge on a cardholder 
who elects to use a credit 
card in lieu of payment by 
cash, check or similar 
means.” 
 
Minnesota 
MINN. STAT. § 
325G.051(a)(1)-
(2) (2012). 
“A seller of goods or 
services may impose a 
surcharge on a purchaser 
who elects to use a credit 
card in lieu of payment by 
cash, check, or similar 
means, provided (1) the 
seller informs the purchaser 
of the surcharge both orally 
at the time of sale and by a 
sign conspicuously posted 
on the seller’s premises, 
and (2) the surcharge does 
not exceed five percent of 
the purchase price.” 
 
New York 
N.Y. GEN. BUS. 
LAW § 518 
(McKinney 
1984). 
“No seller in any sales 
transaction may impose a 
surcharge on a holder who 
elects to use a credit card in 
lieu of payment by cash, 
check, or similar means.” 
Found constitutional in 
Expressions Hair Design 
v. Schneiderman, 803 
F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2015). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
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STATE STATUTE SURCHARGE NOTES 
Oklahoma 
14A OKLA. 
STAT. § 2-
417(a) (2014). 
“No seller in any sales 
transaction may impose a 
surcharge on a cardholder 
who elects to use a credit 
card in lieu of payment by 
cash, check or similar 
means.” 
 
Oklahoma 
14A OKLA. 
STAT. § 2-211 
(2014). 
“No seller in any sales 
transaction may impose a 
surcharge on a cardholder 
who elects an open-end 
credit card or debit-card 
account instead of paying 
by cash, check or similar 
means.” 
 
Puerto Rico 
P.R. CODE 
LAWS tit. 10, §§ 
11 (2008). 
“No merchant shall impose 
a surcharge on a consumer 
who chooses to use a credit 
card instead of cash, check 
or any similar means of 
payment in any transaction 
that involves the sale or 
lease of products and 
services.” 
 
Texas 
TEX. FIN. CODE 
ANN. § 339.001 
(West 2013). 
“In a sale of goods or 
services, a seller may not 
impose a surcharge on a 
buyer who uses a credit 
card for an extension of 
credit instead of cash, a 
check, or a similar means of 
payment.” 
Held constitutional in 
Rowell v. Pettijohn, No. 
1:14-cv-00190 (W.D. 
Tex. Mar. 4, 2014), 
appeal docketed, No. 
15-50168 (5th Cir. Feb. 
26, 2015).  
Utah 
(Allowed to 
sunset) 
UTAH CODE 
ANN. 1953 § 
13-38a-302 
(West 2010). 
A seller may not impose a 
surcharge on a transaction 
for $10,000 or less that is 
paid for by using a credit 
card. 
Sunset Provision: UTAH 
CODE ANN. 1953 § 63I-
1-213(2)(West 2015): 
Sections 13-38a-301 and 
13-38a-302 are repealed 
June 30, 2014. Proposed 
Legislation repeals 
surcharge prohibition. 
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